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No attempt has been made here to cover all the enormous 
material that has been written on our subject, the concept of in­
sight in psychotherapy. An exhaustive reading of this material 
has brought me to a certain conception of the subject and I have 
chosen to present these aspects which seem to me to be most 
relevant.
In the first chapter an attempt has been made to deal with 
the concept from the "generalist's" point of view, mainly in order 
to show its vast usages and functions. The following chapters try 
to analyze several psychotherapeutic theories and their involvement 
with insight. They have been chosen because each one of them con­
tributes some elements which are important for the clarification 
of the concept. The formulation arrived at in this thesis is 
mostly derived from the special contributions of those theories. 
Psychoanalytic theorists have dealt extensively with the phenomenon 
of insight, and provided science with some fundamentals, especially 
with regard to the contents of insight, the what in insight. The 
nondirective approach outlines some of the most significant conditions 
which facilitate any process which occurs in therapy, including in­
sight. Behavior theory, though negating mental processes, concentrates 
on providing new frames of reference which are based on principles 
derived from learning theory. Therapy is now commonly conceptualized
2as being a learning situation; thus the processes that take place 
in the extinction of old and maladaptive modes of behavior and the 
acquisition of new and more adaptive ones can be clarified by 
utilizing some of these principles. Insight, being basically a 
cognitive process, can be better understood in the light of learning 
and problem-solving theories.
It is assumed that insight is a process in which the acquisi­
tion and implementation of knowledge or understanding (which has to 
do with emotions or is about emotions) is basically characterized 
as a process of reorganization, reintegration or as a new combination 
of these knowledge and emotions. The uniqueness of insight derives 
from the creation of this new combination. In this respect, some 
similarities can be found between the process of creativity and 
that of insight. In order to advance our understanding of the 
process of insight it seemed relevant to examine the process of 
creativity to draw an analogy between the two concepts.
3CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT - A GENERALIST'S VIEW
In  psychology, and e s p e c ia l ly  in  p sycho therapy , th e  concept o f 
in s ig h t  p lay s  a prom inent r o l e .  A lthough many have come to  doubt i t s  
u se fu ln e ss  and e f f e c t iv e n e s s ,  i t  i s  s t i l l  w idely  used  and many conno­
ta t io n s  a re  a tta c h e d  to  i t .  An a ttem p t w i l l  be made here  to  sp e c ify  
and analyze  th e se  uses and c o n n o ta tio n s .
The f i r s t  to  in tro d u ce  th e  concept in  a s c i e n t i f i c  manner were 
th e  proponents o f th e  G e s ta l t  th e o ry . A review  o f t h e i r  l i t e r a t u r e  
on in s ig h t  s in ce  1927 shows v a rio u s  ap p roaches. Thus, much work has 
been done by p sy c h o lo g is ts  working w ith  an im a ls , who c o n cep tu a liz ed  
in s ig h t  as a s p e c if ic  form o f le a rn in g , which d i f f e r s  from le a rn in g  
by t r i a l  and e r r o r .  M artin  and A lexander (47) no te  th a t  th e re  e x is t s  
g re a t  c o n f l ic t  between th e  a to m is tic  a s s o c ia t io n  sch o o l, which b e lie v e s  
th a t  in s ig h t  slow ly d e riv e s  from t r i a l  and e r r o r  and a s s o c ia t io n  p ro ­
ced u res , and th e  G e s ta l t  sch o o l, which b e lie v e s  th a t  in s ig h t  i s  a 
sudden p ro c e ss , undeterm ined by t r i a l  and e r r o r .  For G e s ta l t  t h e o r i s t s  
in s ig h t  accompanies an in te g r a t io n  and occurs upon th e  conscious 
r e a l iz a t io n  of w holes.
As to  th e  problem o f in s ig h t  and t r i a l  and e r r o r ,  Anderson and 
Ausubel (3) comment t h a t  in  th e  p sy ch o lo g ica l l i t e r a t u r e ,  " in s ig h t"  
has two p r in c ip a l  c o n n o ta tio n s : (a ) "suddenness" o f d isco v e ry ; and
(b) g rasp  of th e  " s tru c tu re "  o f th e  problem , as evidenced by absence 
o f t r i a l  and e r r o r .  I t  has o f te n  been p o in te d  out t h a t  th e re  i s  no
4necessary connection between the absence of overt trial and error
Z “'behavior and grasp of the problem structure, for trail and error 
may be perceptual or ideational, and no obvious cues may be present 
in behavior to show that it is going on.
Only the Gestalt psychology (Wertheimer, Koffka, Kohler) 
investigated the phenomenon of insight, though they were mainly 
concerned with perceptual and problem-solving forms of insight.
Kohler, for one, performed some dramatic experiments with chimpanzees. 
Discussing them, Hilgard (29) tells how the chimpanzees, at some point 
in working on a problem, appeared to grasp its inner relationships 
in the form of insight.
Kohler’s experiments and Koffka’s studies were largely 
influenced by Wertheimer's thinking. The latter frequently referred 
to the phenomenon of insight as "seeing the light", but he usually 
meant this in a strictly intellectual sense, and he advanced 
challenging ideas about circumstances which facilitate or retard 
insightful learning. They felt that a moderate degree of insight 
is so common in human learning that we tend to take it for granted. 
Occasionally insight comes dramatically, and then we have what has 
been appropriately called an "Aha" experience.
A more contemporary Gestalt theorist, Kurt Lewin (42) when 
discussing insightful learning, referred to change in cognitive 
structure, emphasizing changes in intellectual appreciation and in 
the person's perception of his environmental surroundings rather
5than to a change in a perception of his inner world; although it may 
he presumed that such internal change is closely associated with 
altered cognition. Whenever Lewin referred to insight his primary 
focus was on a clear, and in certain ways abstract, understanding 
of the person’s outer world.
Turning to psychotherapy, one finds many writers who treat the 
extensive body of literature whereby great positive value is attached 
to insight and to its remedial or curative potential.
According to Karno, (33) in psychotherapy "we speak of real 
insight, superficial insight and intellectual insight; of emotional 
insight and unconscious insight. In a planning conference in the 
clinic setting, we may decide that a patient is ’too sick for insight' 
or ’does not have the capacity for insight therapy*, or even 'will 
not accept insight.' It often seems that, if a patient does not get 
well enough to fulfill the therapeutic goals we have set, he by 
definition has never achieved 'real' insight, no matter how eloquently 
or emotionally insightful he may sound to us." Karno claims that the 
true value of the insights gained cannot account for therapeutic 
effect. "It is not the truth of an interpretation or statement of 
insight by the patient which produce therapeutic influence."
Most therapeutic theories rely heavily on insight as a primary 
effector of change in personality. The promotion of insight is widely 
accepted as a major goal in various kinds of learning situations, and 
especially in learning that occurs in therapy. McCary (48) points
6out that the alternate hypothesis holds simply that insight is an 
epiphenomenon, not a cause of change in “behavior, but one of the 
possible (but not necessary) indicators that behavior changes have 
occurred. Direct efforts to promote self-understanding are singu­
larly futile, for deep and comfortable understanding is a symptom 
of adjustment rather than a promotor of it. Thus, interpretations 
designed to encourage the development of insight are acceptable only 
after they are no longer needed. McCary goes on explaining that it 
is difficult to shake off the notion that insight is the central 
process in psychotherapy because we are culturally conditioned to 
believe in it ("know thyself" and so on) and because in psychotherapy 
changes in behavior often occur about the time that insight appears. 
Because of our belief in the efficiency of self-understanding, we are 
willing to assume that the temporal relationship between occurrence 
of insight and change in behavior is so regular that a causal 
relationship can be inferred, forgetting the many times there is 
evidence of insight without evidence of ability to act on the insight, 
and forgetting, too, that changes in behavior in psychotherapy are 
often observed with no evidence of insight either on the part of the 
client or on the part of the therapist. So enamoured are we of the 
postulate that insight changes behavior, that we deny the insight­
fulness of an insight when it does not produce a change in behavior. 
Insights not followed by changes in behavior are "intellectual 
insights"; insights that happen to be observed prior to observation
7of behavior changes are "real" or "emotional" insights. Thus, 
insight is dependent upon an effect of which it is presumed to 
be the cause.
As to the question whether insight is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for behavioral change, Holland (32) assumes 
that the value of insight in altering subsequent adjustment depends 
upon the presence or absence of the conditions necessary for learning, 
such as adequate motivation, suitable reinforcement, and change in 
the actual responses that the patient makes. From this point of 
view, insight is primarily useful as a cue to which type of response 
might lead to more useful or gratifying results that have followed 
upon the patient's established habitual responses. We can, therefore, 
regard insight as potentially useful, but as neither sufficient nor 
necessary to modifications of the patient's behavior in the psycho­
therapeutic situation. Holland concludes that in such a situation 
it is only necessary that the psychotherapist be adequately acquainted 
with cause-effect relationships in personality formation and reformation.
In 19^9 Hobbs (30) commented that although insight is a central 
concept in psychotherapy, its function in the therapeutic process is 
ambiguous. Insight is presumed to be a precursor to change in 
behavior. However, experience in therapy indicates that change may 
occur without insight, and insight does not necessarily produce change. 
The ambiguity may arise from the arbitrary designation of some client 
statements as insightful and others as not insightful, as viewed by
8the psychologist. Understanding of the role of insight may he 
increased by defining the ways in which symbols are related to 
behavior. It is suggested that the efficacy of a symbol is a 
function of its perceived utility in preserving the individual's 
sense of control over his self and his world. Effective therapy 
would then be contingent upon the use of symbols that have immediate 
meaningfulness to the client, which he can employ in the solution of 
problems as he perceives them at the time when the symbols are 
required. Insight may then emerge as a symptom of changes that have 
already occurred.
As time passed, Hobbs (3l) went farther in expressing his 
critical reservation as to the importance of insight as a potential 
curative agent. In 1962 Hobbs contends that one of the firmly rooted 
assumptions in psychotherapeutic practice is that the development of 
insight on the part of the client is a major goal of the therapeutic 
endeavor. If a client can be helped to understand why he behaves as 
he does or to recognize and understand the origin of the neurotic 
tactics that continually defeat him, he will gradually abandon the 
inappropriate behavior and substitute therefore more rational tactics 
in the management of his life. Increased self-understanding is 
regarded as inherently good and as a means to the end of good psycho­
logical health. Hobbs says furthermore that the achievement of 
insight by a client "is a welcomed signal to the therapist that his 
efforts are paying off, and that his client, armed with new under­
standing, will gain a new measure of control over his life. All of
9this is a part of the folklore, both amateur and professional, of 
helping people by talking with them. But I have come seriously to 
doubt the presumed relationship between the achievement of insight 
and the achievement of more effective functioning."
Hobbs goes on to state that "the equipotentiality of diverse 
interpretations is a bothersome thing. It is quite apparent that 
therapists of different theoretical persuasions seem to promote 
different but equally effective insights. All this suggests that 
the occurrence of an insight merely means that the client is catching 
on to the therapist's personal system for interpreting the world of 
behavior. The therapist does not have to be right; he mainly has to 
be convincing."
It seems to Hobbs that the traditional formulation of the 
relationship between self-understanding and effective behavior may 
be backwards. "I suggest that insight is not a cause of change but 
a possible result of change. It is not a source of therapeutic gain 
but one among a number of possible consequences of gain. It may or 
may not occur in therapy; whether it does or not is inconsequential, 
since it reflects only the preferred modes of expression of the 
therapist or the client. It is not a change agent, it is a by-product 
of change. In a word, insight is an epiphenomenon."
Hobbs concludes by saying, "The concept of insight can have 
meaning only as a part of the process of elaborating on some particular 
system for interpreting events. There are no true insights, only more 
or less useful ones."
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Hobbs’ doubts as to the usefulness of insight as a curative 
agent are based on a narrow definition of ’’understanding." When 
he presents his formulation of "forces making for change" he speaks 
about the patient's experiences in his relationship with the therapist, 
and he points to the process of growing awareness of the range of 
human experience, which is one of the characteristics of insight.
We have mentioned some doubts and reservations brought forward 
by authorities as to the importance and central role attributed to 
insight in the psychotherapeutic process. Some of these doubts are 
indeed weighty and deserve our attention. Now let us retrace our 
steps and examine the process itself, as described by some writers. 
"Described" is a word used here deliberately, since none of the 
definitions offered can, to my mind, stand the test of scientific 
logic - not even that of operational requirements. It seems that 
most of the writers have surrendered quite easily, and retreated to 
the less satisfactory line of describing a process.
Hilgard (29), while dealing with therapeutic insight, says that 
it refers to the understanding of the roots of the conflict. The 
process of insight is a gradual increase in self-knowledge. The 
patient must both understand his feelings and feel what he under­
stands. The reorientation is never simply intellectual. The discovery 
by the subject of dynamic connections between earlier and later events, 
so that he comes to recognize the roots of his conflict - this, 
according to him, is insight.
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Menninger (50) describes some characteristic behavior patterns 
and remarks that insight may be defined as the recognition by the 
patient (l) that this or that aspect of his feelings and attitudes, 
this or that technique of behavior, this or that role in which he 
casts other people, is of a pattern; (2) that this pattern originated 
long ago and stamps itself in every step of his life; it is present 
in his analytic relationships; (3) that this pattern originated for 
a reason which was valid at the time, and persisted despite changes 
in some of the circumstances which originally determined it; (4) that 
this pattern contains elements which are offensive and injurious to 
others as well as expensive and troublesome to the patient. Insight 
is the simultaneous identification of the characteristic behavior 
patterns together with an understanding of why they were and are used 
as they were and are.
Lonergan (4-5) points out that insight has several characteristics, 
namely: (l) comes as a release to the tension of inquiry; (2) comes
suddenly and unexpectedly; (3) is a function not of outer circumstances 
but of inner conditions; (4) pivots between the concrete and the 
abstract; (5) passes into the habitual texture of one's mind.
There are different dynamic patterns of experience. All insight 
arises from sensitive or imaginative presentations; various elements 
in the experience that is organized by the pattern. Like the acts of 
direct and introspective understanding, the act of reflective under­
standing is an insight.
Stein (76) follows this line of thinking. According to him, 
insight results from applied understanding. He explains that the
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creation of insight is the goal of interpretation, one of the most 
important therapeutic maneuvers. Insight is a loosely used concept 
and is often given a variety of definitions. Understanding of one’s 
motivations and even of one's characterological defenses is usually 
equated with insight. Understanding should be distinguished from 
true insight. Whereas understanding is essentially an intellectual 
grasp of the meaning of past experience, insight requires an added 
inner sense of emotional conviction that comes from action based 
upon new understanding. Insight, therefore, results from applied 
understanding. In this sense, it represents the emotional impact 
of effective learning and often has a lasting effect upon the 
adaptive efficiency of the patient.
We meet psychoanalytically-treated patients who have a meticulous 
grasp of their conflicts - but who have not changed. Their under­
standing has never been converted into new activity and they have 
never gained the true insight that in turn leads to an altered 
anticipation of the future. Insight gained during adaptive activity 
helps to create hopeful anticipation. Insight supplies a sense of 
emotional conviction about the reliability of our perceptions and 
capacities. If insight is created by effective application of under­
standing, it cannot be achieved on the couch. The only true insights 
gained in the consultation room refer to the relationship of the 
patient with the therapist. Insight into relationships with others 
comes about through the practical application of understanding in
real life
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Though we are not dealing here with the problem of the relation­
ship between the therapist and the client, one essential point is 
worth mentioning - the experience of togetherness as a form of insight. 
Pentony (54) mentions that the "essence of insight is that it is an 
integral part of growing together with the other - a building of a 
relationship that has team-like quality. As two or more people come 
to think of themselves as *we', there is an increasing sensitivity 
to the inner world of each other." He goes on to explain that in any 
successful therapy there is a quality of an interpersonal process.
"It involves the formation of a coalition characterized by overt 
cooperation and increased empathy."
It is obvious that common agreement exists as far as viewing the 
function of insight as the assimilation and integration of knowledge. 
Arbuckle (6) says that insight usually implies that not only does the 
individual know his assets and liabilities, but he operates with some 
reference to them. Insightfulness includes the internalization of 
knowledge, so that it becomes a part of the total operational indivi­
dual rather than an intellectual appendage.
Insight would appear to be an understanding that one may gain 
about himself, but it is a product of experiencing more than knowing. 
Insight is a sort of end product. It is a deep and meaningful under­
standing, by me, about me, and about others.
Conscious insight has the quality of intricate fact-finding, or 
even of simple memory of related details. Through hindsight, the 
patient forms such details into a significant gestalt. Unconscious
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insight has a quality of experiencing. Intellectual insight is no 
longer "sine qua non", in improvement in psychotherapy. It may be 
epiphenomenal but not necessarily causal.
Ludwig (46) suggests some operational criteria for testing the 
therapeutic efficacy of insights. The truth or falseness of insight 
seems irrelevant to its effects. It seems that insight can be regarded 
as therapeutic when it meets all of the following specifications:
A. Consistency (the deductive elaboration based on the original insight 
should be stable and logically sound);
B. Continuity (insights must take place within some existing theoretical 
framework);
C. Personal consequences (the therapeutic aspect of insight must also 
be judged by the fruit it bears);
D. Social consequences (insight should induce greater rapport, empathy, 
and consideration for others).
Insight as a suddenly illumination or enlightenment is rare in 
therapy but it consists of numerous small ripples of insights which 
are experienced and intellectually assimilated over a long period of 
time.
We have shown that understanding has been promoted to the 
essential agent in providing the grounds and means for change in the 
therapeutic situation. Due to the tremendous influence of psycho­
analysis, insight has generally been equated with self-understanding.
(We will devote our next chapter to the discussion of insight in 
psychoanalysis). In referring to the knowledge acquired, Whitehead
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coined a phrase: "You cannot be wise without some knowledge, but you
may easily acquire knowledge and remain bare of wisdom. Wisdom is 
the way in which knowledge is held." This saying signifies the 
importance of the way in which knowledge, and in our frame of 
reference "understanding", are put together or utilized. It is 
commonly agreed that if such understanding (following the interpreta­
tion) does not produce the anticipated behavioral change, this is due 
to the fact that the insight has merely been an intellectual one, 
while in order to induce a change an emotional insight is needed, 
namely some kind of understanding accompanied by an emotional reaction. 
As to the emotional component of insight, Martin and Alexander (V7) 
point out that effective insight results not merely in the patient 
"understanding" and "knowing" something new about himself, but in 
suddenly feeling and experiencing something new and different. They 
say that insight is only possible after a previous emotional adjustment 
has been made and the patient is able to accept and assimilate it.
They imply that insight only occurs when there is the realization and 
experience of integration with its emotional component. One has to 
increase the patient’s awareness to the extent of his conflict involve­
ment, in order to induce insight. Awareness and total involvement in 
inner conflict accompany reintegration and insight.
Though the central therapeutic issue in psychoanalysis is the 
mobilization of unconscious material into consciousness, "making the 
unknown known", psychoanalysts consider insight to be effective only 
when it coincides with emotional abreaction. As Freud put it, "An
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enemy cannot be licked who is not seen." According to the psycho­
analysts, the corrective emotional experience in the transference, 
accompanied by a well-timed and accurate interpretation, should 
produce a lasting therapeutic result. An intellectual insight based 
on gains can pave the way for a new emotional and curative experience.
Zilboorg (87), on his part, states that insight functions and 
serves the purpose of reorientation and reintegration of the ego. In 
dealing with emotional insight he explains that every approach to 
insight, every step in the direction of better understanding of one’s 
self, may be considered a process of ever-increasing insight, but 
insight is qualitative and it cannot be fractional; moreover, since 
insight is not something which a mere explanation of the cause of 
one's trouble can resolve, no insight can be "given." Insight should 
be looked upon as the ultimate and crowning point of integration of 
ego functioning.
Granted that some sort of insight is always needed for the 
preservation of good therapeutic results, what is the nature of this 
insight? Therapeutic reintegration must be not only an affective 
experience but an affective process, a series of affective reconstruc­
tive experiences coming from within the psychic apparatus - and not 
from without - and coming in all the fullness and completeness of the 
various cathexes. Insight becomes an excellent agency for strengthening 
the repressive forces of the ego. The whole problem of ego reliving 
and ego reintegration is, in the final analysis, a problem of causing 
it to be relived in the transference. Zilboorg concludes that insight
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through transference is the only type of insight which serves the 
purpose of reorientation and reintegration of the ego. Such insight 
is a purely affective process in the wake of which follows rational 
and affective appreciation of a new orientation of the ego toward the 
world and toward one’s own self. It has thus been found that mere 
cerebral, cold understanding is not sufficient; that one ought to 
feel what one thinks in order to let the understanding do its salutary 
work. Nevertheless, what emotional understanding means remains unknown. 
Also, no one has satisfactorily defined the "emotional component" of 
intellectual understanding.
In order to avoid the juxtaposition of intellectual and emotional 
insight, and in order to analyze the process in workable terms, Reid 
and Finesinger (58) provide a new model and new terms. They view in­
sight as being mainly a cognitive process, although they do not exclude 
its emotional aspects. They comment that while such cognitive processes 
as perceiving, identifying and remembering are necessary psychological 
conditions of insight, they are not sufficient. "Insight is based 
upon and utilizes these simpler mental processes, but it adds something 
more or, rather, it relates and organizes the contents and products of 
such cognitive activities so that some heretofore ungrasped meaning, 
some new but relevant and significant relationship is, perhaps for the 
first time, clearly understood.
Insight may be into any one of four kinds of relations, or into 
any combination of these relations. These relations may, for con­






When we stop and consider the kinds of thought processes in 
our patients to which we give the name of insight, we believe that, 
in most instances, the insight will be into a sign-significate or a 
cause-effect relation, although more or less indirectly symbol-referent 
and means-end relations are probably always involved. This is true 
because a large part of the patient's material is verbal, i.e., 
consists of symbols, and because the patient, both intentionally and 
unwittingly, is trying by both verbal and nonverbal means to attain 
various ends, including attempts to influence the thoughts, attitudes, 
and overt behaviors of the therapist."
Reid and Finesinger distinguish between "neutral insight", 
"emotional insight" and "dynamic insight."
Referring to neutral insight, they comment that they do not 
disagree with what is evidently meant by the term "intellectual 
insight." "We feel that, since any insight by definition is 
intellectual or, as we prefer to say, cognitive, it is less misleading 
to call the sort of insight in question neutral. By this we mean to 
imply that neither of the terms in the relation whose significance 
is grasped by the act of insight is an emotion, nor does the act of 
insight mediate or release at the time an emotional response in the 
person who has the insight."
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"Emotional" insight is described as an expression about an 
emotion. It also cognitively mediates an emotional response at the 
time. When insight is in this sense emotional, it makes the patient 
conscious of a fact, which itself may or may not be an emotion, that 
releases or sets off an emotional response.
Does the patient, who merely understands the role of his 
emotions in producing his symptoms, have emotional insight? "In the 
sense indicated, yes; that is to say, he interprets his symptoms as 
being partly due to his emotions, his emotions in this relation being 
a part of the complex referent of the descriptive symbols constituting 
the causal interpretation in question. In this kind of emotional 
insight, the emotion is a part of the subject-matter into which the 
patient has insight, or, more precisely, it is a term in the relation 
whose significance is grasped through insight."
Dynamic insight is grasped in the "Freudian sense of penetrating 
the repressive barrier and making the ego aware of certain hypercathected 
wishes that were previously unconscious. In terms of their logical 
scheme of relations, such dynamic insight is into a set of sign- 
significate and cause-effect relations, in which some of the terms, 
i.e., the significate and the cause, are unconscious, in the dynamic 
sense of this word that implies repressed. There would be no dynamic 
insight, if there were no Freudian unconscious." Reid and Finesinger 
admit the difficulties in finding an answer to the question, how 
dynamic insight produces therapeutic effects. They adopt Freud’s 
conception by saying: "It does so through the ’economic’ shifts
brought about with their consequent alterations in the unconscious
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cathexes on 'thought-contents' at various levels or organization in 
the symbolic behavior of the patient. As a result of this unconscious 
revolution, various forms of energy may be released and become avail­
able for the constructive purposes of the no longer id-enslaved ego, 
which is therefore better able to make choices that are not blind or 
compulsive but in the light of relevant facts and values."
Of the three kinds of insight that have been distinguished, 
neutral, emotional, and dynamic, the last produces the most extensive 
changes in the character structure of the patient and probably brings 
about the most lasting therapeutic benefits. But, they go on saying, 
it is naive to assume that even dynamic insight is always a good 
thing, and that the more of it the better. In most cases of psycho­
neuroses, because of its problem-solving and tension-reducing effects, 
insight does tend to relieve symptoms and to yield some satisfaction.
"Many sorts of interpersonal factors are important in establish­
ing and maintaining a doctor-patient relationship of the kind that 
will tend to promote insight. If the doctor is viewed by the patient 
as a well-trained competent person who is warm and friendly and who 
will do his utmost to help him, if the patient feels 'safe'."
They conclude by discussing the overall positive effect of 
insight: "This favorable atmosphere facilitates the necessary re­
learning on the part of the patient. The reduction in the intensity 
of negative secondary drives results in a better hedonic balance or 
in an improved realignment of emotional vectors in the patient's 
personality. This over-all positive gain, since it accrues to the
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patient in the same situation as the cognitive acts of insight, tends 
both to promote the insight and to consolidate it, once it has occurred. 
It does more. In reducing resistances, it acts like a psychic enzyme, 
a kind of ’spreading factor,’ which favors the extension of the in­
sight, its carryover to other basically similar conflicts in the 
personality. Ideally, the insight is generalized and is applied to 
as many relevant cases as possible. One ’sees’ the pattern. But what 
is even more important, he sees it at a time when the rigidities of 
old habits are softened up, become less brittle and more malleable, 
owing to the favorable emotional climate - the optimal temperature to 
make the reaction ’go’ and to yield ’results.*"
Instead of dealing with the problematical distinction between 
emotional and intellectual insight, Reid and Finesinger produce three 
terms of their own. "Neutral" insight is defined to be neutral with 
respect to emotion. "Emotional" insight is supposed to make the 
patient conscious of some fact which then "cognitively mediates" on 
emotion. But the fact that one kind of insight is not about an 
emotion, while the other i£ about it, does not justify a distinction 
as far as cognitive processes are involved. It is well accepted that 
some cognitions may be about emotion, as well as about other factors. 
Cognitive processes cannot be perceived as being "pure" and sterile - 
they are "contaminated" by emotional components. Thus it seems that 
the authors’ distinction between the two is artificial and does not 
even serve the purpose of clarifying the processes. Their contribution 
consists of perceiving insight as being mainly a cognitive process 
(rather than intellectual). Their "dynamic" insight is very similar 
to what has been defined by others as "emotional" insight. They 
claim that "dynamic" insight produces therapeutic effects, ’through
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th e  "econom ic’s h i f t s  brought about w ith  t h e i r  consequent a l t e r a t io n s  
in  th e  unconscious cathexes on " th o u g h t-co n ten ts"  a t  v a rio u s  le v e ls  
of o rg a n iz a tio n  in  th e  symbolic b eh av io r of th e  p a t i e n t . ’ This 
e x p lan a tio n  le av e s  th e  o r ig in a l  problem untouched . In  p la ce  of 
ask ing  why some in s ig h ts  have th e ra p e u tic  e f f e c t s  w hile  o th e rs  do n o t, 
we now ask  why some in s ta n c e s  of "dynamic" in s ig h t  e f f e c t  "economic 
s h i f t s "  and a l t e r a t io n s  in  th e  unconscious ca th ex es  o f " th o u g h t-co n ten ts"  
w hile  o th e r  in s ta n c e s  do n o t.
The a c q u is i t io n  o f knowledge i s  d e a lt  w ith  by R ic h f ie ld  ( 59)»
He produces an in te r e s t in g  a n a ly s is  o f th i s  p ro c e ss , and he shows i t s  
a p p l i c a b i l i ty  and u t i l i t y  w ith in  th e  framework o f th e ra p e u tic  in s ig h t .  
His work i s  based  on a d i s t in c t iv e  p h ilo s o p h ic a l fo u n d a tio n  - an a ttem p t 
to  g ive a c e r ta in  type  o f sy stem a tic  re s ta te m e n t o f what one means when 
one a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e re  a re  some in s ig h ts  o f p a r t i c u la r  th e ra p e u tic  
im portance in  p sy ch o an a ly tic  tre a tm e n t, and th a t  th ey  a re  d i f f e r e n t  
from o th e r  in s ig h ts  in  v a rio u s  r e s p e c ts .  R ic h f ie ld  comments th a t  i t  
i s  p r im a r i ly  in  th e  problem o f "em otional" in s ig h ts  th a t  th e  g re a te s t  
d i f f i c u l t y  i s  found. The c o n tra s t  o f " in te l l e c tu a l"  and "em otional" 
in s ig h t  i s  made re p e a te d ly , b u t never w ith  adequate  c l a r i t y .  How any 
co g n itio n  i s  r e la te d  to  i t s  a lle g e d  a f f e c t iv e  components in  "em otional" 
in s ig h t  has no t been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  s ta t e d .  G en era lly , th e  c o n tra s t  
m erely s ig n i f ie s  a vague d if fe re n c e  between an i n t e l l e c t u a l  u n der­
s tan d in g  and some k ind  of u n d ers tan d in g  accompanied by an em otional 
re a c t io n .
What i s  needed i s  some account of how any in s ig h t ,  which i s  an 
e s s e n t ia l ly  c o g n itiv e  p ro c e ss , can m an ifest th e  em otive p ro p e r t ie s
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necessary to effect the behavioral readaptation involved in cure.
Here Richfield arrives at his main distinction: "There are two
fundamentally different ways in which we can know things. Perhaps 
the clearest distinction between ways of knowing was formulated by 
Bertrand Russell when he separated our knowledge of objects from our 
knowledge of facts or truths about such objects. Differences in the 
cognitive content here imply certain differences in cognitive pro­
cesses. Russell calls attention to the latter differences with his 
discussion of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description:
'I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct 
cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of 
the object itself.' Acquaintance, then, describes any cognition in 
which knowledge is obtained without logical dependence upon any 
inferential process or other knowledge of facts. Richfield clarifies 
the difference between the two by saying that, "knowledge by descrip­
tion transcends the limits of the private experience we have in the 
cognitive relations of acquaintance. In knowledge by description 
there is a cognition that something is true. Knowledge here takes 
the form of judgments about an object. The fact referred to by the 
judgment, and not the object itself, is what is known. Knowledge by 
acquaintance is neither excluded by, nor incompatible with, knowledge 
by description. The use of this dichotomy should not be oversimplified. 
Few instances of knowledge are likely to consist of one or the other 
form alone. But analysis of any instance of knowledge involves the 
use of these concepts of different kinds of knowledge. No distaste 
for dichotomy will make knowledge of a given x which we get by
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d e s c r ip t io n  e q u iv a len t to  th e  knowledge ga ined  from an experience  
in  which th e  same x i s  an a c tu a l  c o n s t i tu e n t .
"There may be c a se s , th e n , in  which one has t ru e  judgment 
w ithou t a cq u a in tan ce .
" I f  I  am acq u a in ted  w ith  a th in g  which e x i s t s ,  my acquain tance  
g iv es  me th e  knowledge th a t  i t  e x i s t s .  But i t  i s  no t t r u e  t h a t ,  
co n v erse ly , whenever I  can know th a t  a th in g  o f a c e r ta in  s o r t  
e x i s t s ,  I  o r someone e ls e  must be acq u a in ted  w ith  th e  th in g .
"The e s s e n t ia l  p o in t fo r  our purpose i s  th a t  any c o g n itio n  of 
a su b je c t which i s  d e riv ed  by d e s c r ip t io n  i s  knowledge about t h a t  
su b je c t and may be independent of any acq u a in tan ce  w ith  th e  same 
s u b je c t ."
"Handling" an in s ig h t  invo lves an a c tu a l  read ju stm en t o f emotions 
which p e rm its  th e  p a t ie n t  to  face  no t sim ply th e  t r u t h  about some 
c o n f l ic t in g  d r iv e , b u t th e  incom patib le  f e e l in g s  them selves which 
a re  to  be c o r re la te d  w ith  c u rre n t symptoms.
R ic h f ie ld  p o in ts  out t h a t  " th e  f i n a l  in s ig h ts  m ain ta ined  by th e  
ego th a t  enab le  th e  p a t ie n t  to  develop and s u s ta in  adequate c o n tro l 
over h is  in s t in c tu a l  l i f e  may c o n s is t  o f knowledge by d e s c r ip t io n ;  
th a t  i s ,  o f t r u th s  about th e  em otional c o n s te l la t io n s  a g a in s t  which 
he developed th e  o r ig in a l  n e u ro tic  d e fe n se s . But th e  co g n itio n s  
t h a t  ach ieve  th i s  in s ig h t  must r e s u l t  from th e  d i r e c t  r e la t io n  
between th e  knower and h is  f e e l in g s ."
R ic h f ie ld  concludes by say ing  th a t  "an in s ig h t  should  not be 
c l a s s i f i e d  accord ing  to  i t s  su b je c t m a tte r  a lo n e , w hether conscious
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or unconscious, o r co n sid ered  in  some vague way to  be ’em o tio n a l’ , 
’ i n t e l l e c t u a l ' ,  ’psychological* , ’v e r b a l ’ , o r ’r e a l ' .  I t  i s  more 
u s e fu l  to  d e sc rib e  how th e  in s ig h t  was o b ta in ed , w hether by acq u a in ­
tan ce  or by d e s c r ip t io n , and th en  in  term s of t h i s  fundam ental 
c la s s i f y in g  p r in c ip le  to  a rran g e  in s ta n c e s  o f in s ig h ts  accord ing  to  
t h e i r  ’d e p th ’ or t h e i r  c o n te n ts . To u n d erstand  what an in s ig h t  
concerns does no t e x p la in  as much as knowing how t h i s  knowledge i s  
p o sse sse d ."
R ic h f ie ld ’s a n a ly s is  invokes some p h ilo s o p h ic a l and th e o r e t i c a l  
concepts in  o rd e r to  e x p la in  and h e lp  u n d ers tan d  th e  p ro cesses  by 
means o f which knowledge i s  a cq u ire d . But i t  seems d o u b tfu l w hether 
we can e a s i ly  adap t them to  th e  th e ra p e u t ic a l  s i tu a t io n .  R ic h f ie ld  
h im se lf m entions t h a t  "knowledge by acq u a in tan ce  i s  n e i th e r  excluded 
by, nor incom patib le  w ith , knowledge by d e s c r ip t io n .  Few in s ta n c e s  
o f knowledge a re  l i k e l y  to  c o n s is t  o f one o r th e  o th e r ."  Even 
th e o r e t i c a l ly  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d is t in g u is h  between th e  two, even 
more so in  th e  th e r a p e u t ic a l  s i tu a t io n  when one faces  such an 
in d iv id u a l - em otional "knowledge"• Moreover, b e fo re  one can a ttem p t 
th e  abov e-d iscu ssed  d i s t in c t io n ,  th e  e x is te n c e  o f a c e r ta in  under­
ly in g  knowledge, u n d ers tan d in g  o r in s ig h t ,  which have a lre a d y  been 
acq u ired  o r p o ssessed  befo rehand , i s  assumed a p r i o r i . R ic h f ie ld 's  
a n a ly s is  does not o f f e r  an e x p lan a tio n  as to  th e  d e r iv a tio n  of such 
knowledge o r in s ig h t .
There i s  much t r u t h ,  to  my mind, in  R ic h f ie ld 's  s ta tem en t th a t  
to  un d ers tan d  what an in s ig h t  concerns does not e x p la in  as much as
knowing how t h i s  i s  p o sse sse d . In  o rd er to  advance our understand ing
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we must shift our interests from the contents to the process, but 
the difficulty lies in the fact that these two facets are so inter­
woven, To this problem of "how" and "what" in insight, Ross (65)
contributes by stating that what is needed is some account of why 
any insight, which is essentially a cognitive process, can manifest 
emotive proprieties necessary to effect the behavior readaptation 
involved in cure.
An insight should not be classified according to its subject 
matter alone, whether conscious or unconscious, or considered in some 
vague way to be "emotional", "intellectual", "psychological", or 
"real". It is more useful to describe how the insight was obtained,
whether by acquaintance or by description, and then in terms of this
fundamental classifying principle to arrange instances of insight 
according to their "depth" or their content. It is not alone that 
"the voice of the intellect is soft"; it speaks in two voices.
Neither of them by itself is likely to produce the final emotional 
adjustments sought in many forms of psychotherapy.
It becomes clear that intellectual and emotional insight go 
hand in hand and that true intellectual insight cannot develop without 
its essential emotional precondition. Insight cannot occur when the 
person is not ready to observe himself carefully and when he is un­
willing to establish in the course of this self-investigation intimate 
familiarity with the full range of his experiences.
In concluding this discussion let us point out that insight is 
employed equivocally. What is needed is an adequate theoretical 
understanding of its therapeutic effect upon behavior. This understanding
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has to  he based  on - o r dependent upon - an u n d erstand ing  of th e  
d if fe re n c e s  between th e  v a rio u s  f a c e ts  o f in s ig h t ,  which ad m itted ly  
a re  very  d i f f i c u l t  to  c l a s s i f y .  "No e f f e c t iv e  schem atic p r in c ip le  
has been fo rm ulated  which i s  a t  once com patible w ith  a l l  th e  f a c ts  
known, c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  t h e r a p i s t ’s in te n tio n s  in  h is  uses of 
th e  te rm , and u s e fu l  in  h is  e f f o r t s  to  i s o la te  th e  th e ra p e u tic  




Psychoanalysis, more than any other theory, left its imprint 
on modem thinking in general, and on psychotherapy in particular.
Freud tried to formulate a comprehensive theory regarding human 
behavior, and presented new techniques of treating maladaptive 
behavior. Insight plays a prominent role in psychoanalysis, and 
gaining insight is almost a pre-condition of the occurrence of any 
change through the psychotherapeutic process.
When Freud undertook self-analysis, he experienced a revealing 
insight as to the causal relationships between past experiences and 
present functioning. Holland (32) describes also the way in which 
this self-analysis helped him to advance his theory.
Freud’s development of psychoanalysis led to a lengthy reconstruc­
tion of the patient’s development history with subsequent insight into 
the relationship between earlier experiences and the contemporary 
functioning of the patient. This development occurred primarily in 
the period between I89O and 1900. This is when Freud undertook his 
self-analysis, using his dreams as a primary means of access to aspects 
of his own cognitive processes of which he was not normally or usually 
aware. The integration of this information with Freud’s memory of 
past experiences and his knowledge of present desires, impulses, and 
behavior gave him new insights. It was these insights that formed 
the basis for Freud's psychoanalytic psychology. As to the therapeutic
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effect of such insights as far as the patients are concerned, we 
surmise that knowing more about the principles governing his own 
functioning is of some - or perhaps considerable - value to the 
patient in making decisions about future actions.
The fundamental aim of psychoanalytic therapy is to "make what 
is unconscious conscious." The persistent theme running through its 
literature suggests that the development of insight is the basic aim 
of psychotherapy and that gaining self-knowledge is somewhat synonymous 
with emotional well-being. Freud himself comments on this as follows:
"An analysis is ended when the analyst and the patient cease to meet 
each other for the analytic session. This happens when two conditions 
have been approximately fulfilled: first, that the patient shall no
longer be suffering from his symptoms and shall have overcome his 
anxieties and his inhibitions; and secondly, that the analyst shall 
judge that so much repressed material has been made conscious, so 
much that was unintelligible has been explained, and so much internal 
resistance conquered, that there is no need to fear a repetition of 
the pathological processes concerned."
His statement is clear: repressed material reduces and prevents
future pathological processes. Hobbs (3l) grasped this central and 
crucial psychoanalytic tenet when he noted: "One of the firmly rooted
assumptions in psychotherapeutic practice is that the development of 
insight on the part of the client is both a major goal of the therapeutic 
endeavor, intrinsically worth promulgating, and a primary means of 
achieving step by step in the therapeutic process, the overall objective 
of more effective functioning."
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Here Singer (72) comments that one sees Freud’s abiding respect 
for reason and his unflagging insistence that intellectual honesty is 
a prerequisite for dignified human existence. Whatever the origins 
of his orientation, whether rooted partially in Freud’s Jewishness 
and the traditional emphasis of Judaism on reason and intellectual 
understanding and/or in some aspects of his personality, the perpetual 
insistence on intellectual appreciation of weighty issues permeated 
Freud’s life and writing. This outlook and deeply ingrained way of 
life had important consequences for the development of the concept of 
insight•
Freud was convinced that insight and intellectual understanding 
were synonymous. He was quite frank (2l) in discussing his early 
position: "It is true that in the early days of analytic technique
we took an intellectualist view of the situation. We set a high 
value on the patient’s knowledge of what he had forgotten, and in 
this we made hardly any distinction between our knowledge and his.
We thought it a special piece of good luck if we were able to obtain 
information about the forgotten childhood trauma from other sources - 
for instance from parents or nurses or the seducer himself - as in 
some cases it was possible to do; and we hastened to convey the 
information and the proofs of its correctness to the patient, in the 
certain expectation of bringing the neurosis and the treatement to a 
rapid end. It was a severe disappointment when the expected success 
was not forthcoming. How could it be that the patient, who now knew 
about his traumatic experience, nevertheless still behaved as if he 
knew no more about it than before."
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Singer goes on to say that after reading this passage one would 
have expected that Freud would outline some radical change in his 
approach to the problem and abandon his emphasis on intellectual under­
standing. But, says Singer, he merely changed his tactics and shifted 
from "informing" the patient about the traumas of his childhood to 
attempts at "informing" the patient about the reasons for his inability 
to recall such data willingly. This is, of course, what was meant by 
the "analysis of the resistance." Once the resistances were overcome 
by helping the patient see the reasons for their existence, intellectual 
knowledge of the original traumas would be accepted. The emotional 
attachment of the patient to the analyst, his transference, was the 
vehicle which was to make acceptance and intellectual appreciation 
more palatable. On this Freud commented: "Often enough the trans­
ference is able to remove the symptoms of the disease by itself, but 
only for a while - only for as long as it itself lasts. In this case 
the treatment is a treatment of suggestion, and not a psycho-analysis 
at all. It only deserves the latter name if the intensity of the 
transference has been utilized for the overcoming of resistances.
"Thus the new sources of strength for which the patient is 
indebted to his analyst are reducible to transference and instruction 
(through the communications made to him). The patient, however, only 
makes use of the instruction in so far as he is induced to do so by 
the transference; and it is for this reason that our first communica­
tion should be withheld until a strong transference has been established."
Thus Freud proposed that the road to intellectual insight was 
more difficult and tortuous than he had first thought, but the end
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s ta t io n ,  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  u n d erstand ing  o f one’s m o tiv a tio n s , rem ained 
i n t a c t .
B ut, co n tin u es  S in g e r, d e sp ite  p a t i e n t s ’ ev en tu a l accep tance of 
ex p lan a tio n s  o ffe re d  to  them, in  a l l  to o  many in s ta n c e s  t h e i r  neuroses 
d id  no t d isa p p e a r . V arious ex p lan a tio n s  fo r  th e se  d is tu rb in g  p e r ­
s is te n c e s  were advanced, bu t th e y  were in v a r ia b ly  couched in  term s 
which would not v io la te  th e  b a s ic  maxim th a t  th e  road  to  em otional 
w e ll-b e in g  was i n t e l l e c t u a l  u n d e rs tan d in g . E v en tu a lly , however, i t  
o ccu rred  to  some th a t  a d isc a rd in g  of t h i s  fo rm u la tio n  was c a l le d  f o r .
And so a g rad u a l d e c lin e  of th e  eq u a tio n  ’in s ig h t  i s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
u n d e rs tan d in g ’ s e t  in .  Some au th o rs  proposed th a t  in s ig h t  ought to  
be understood  as a p ro cess  o f in te g ra t in g  unconscious ten d en c ie s  
in to  th e  conscious mind r a th e r  th an  as a p ro cess  of u n d e rs tan d in g . 
A ss im ila tio n  s ta r te d  to  tak e  th e  p la ce  of understand ing  in  t h i s  
d e f in i t io n .
As fo r  th e  v a lu e  o f knowledge in  p sy ch o an a ly sis , Sager (68) 
ex p resses  some doubts as to  th e  im portance of th e  v e rb a l fo rm u la tio n  
o f in s ig h t  inducing  change.
In s ig h t in  th e  p sy ch o an a ly tic  sense i s  not n ecessa ry  fo r  good 
m ental h e a l th .  Knowledge of one’s m o tiv a tio n s , a b i l i t i e s ,  l im ita t io n s  
and p o te n t ia l  fo r  d i s to r t in g  r e a l i t y  i s  im portan t to  any w e ll- fu n c tio n in g  
p e rso n . Knowledge of th o se  fa c to r s  th a t  a re  r e la te d  to  h is  e a r l i e s t  
exp erien ces  i s  no t o r d in a r i ly  needed, nor i s  i t  re q u ire d  o r even fe a s ib le  
in  some in s ta n c e s , in  o rd e r to  produce an e f f e c t iv e  and permanent 
p e r s o n a l i ty  change. The va lue  of in s ig h t  stems from one’s a b i l i t y  to  
app ly  a d u lt  reason  and knowledge in  th e  e v a lu a tio n  o f an erroneous
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p e rc e p tio n  or concep tion  on which was based, one’ s fo rm erly  unconscious 
id e a t io n  and re a c t io n .  The in s ig h t  presum ably g iv es  one th e  b a s is  fo r  
changing th a t  which le d  to  d i s to r te d  p e rc e p tio n , c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n  o r 
in a p p ro p r ia te  r e a c t io n .  I f  change i s  th e  r e s u l t ,  th e  p a t ie n t  must 
accep t th e  v a l id i t y  o f th e  in s ig h t  on a l l  le v e l s  of co n sc io u sn ess .
He must t e s t  and r e t e s t  in  l i f e ’s experience  th e  new or c o rre c te d  
in fo rm atio n  th a t  c o n s t i tu te s  in s ig h t .
We may assume th a t  in  th e rap y  we can b r in g  about changes in  th e  
p a t i e n t ’s a c t i v i t i e s  o r o p e ra tio n a l concepts by b rin g in g  to  b ea r on 
him in flu e n c e s  of which he need no t f u l ly  be aw are. That i s ,  he does 
n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  always have v e rb a lly  fo rm u la ted  in s ig h t  in to  th e  
f a c to r s  th a t  change him. Although re le a rn in g  i s  c e r ta in ly  in c reased  
by in s ig h t ,  some i s  in te n s i f i e d  by i t s e l f .
I n te rp r e ta t io n s  a re  th e  prim ary  re so u rce  in  th e ra p e u tic  
p ro c e sse s , because in te r p r e ta t io n  i s  th e  a n a ly t ic  a c t  p a r -e x c e lle n c e .
The a n a ly s t ,  ex p la in s  Sherman (7 0 ), an a lyzes th e  compounds in to  
s im p les . In s ig h ts  a re  what th e  p a t ie n t  a c q u ire s  in  tre a tm e n t, 
e s p e c ia l ly  when he accep ts  and understands th e  in te r p r e ta t io n .
"W orking-through" i s  what th e  p a t ie n t  does -  and needs to  do -  w ith  
th e  in s ig h t .
Dewald ( l b ) d e sc r ib e s  th e  p ro cess  of "w orking-through" as fo llo w s : 
"The w orking-through p ro cess  in v o lves a r e p e t i t iv e  cy c le  of m o b iliz a tio n  
o f c o n f l i c t  and a n x ie ty , fo llow ed  by a tem porary  symptomatic ex acerb a­
t io n ,  in  tu rn  fo llow ed by in c re a s in g  conscious awareness of th a t  which 
p re v io u s ly  was warded o f f ,  and th en  by a p a r t i a l  re s o lu t io n  o f c o n f l i c t  
and re d u c tio n  o f a n x ie ty  as conscious ego p ro cesses  o f in te g ra t io n  ta k e
c o n tro l
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"The therapist, through his interventions and focusing, attempts 
to help the patient recognize the same conflict or constellation of 
mental processes in a variety of different current situations, as well 
as in genetically earlier forms. The therapist also attempts to vary 
the approach to the problems from the different perspectives of id, 
ego or super-ego functions."
The process of working-through thus involves the patient 
repeatedly extending his awareness of his problems in their different 
forms and from different points of view, until the desired degree of 
insight and understanding has been achieved. Working-through results 
in a further elaboration and understanding of material which is 
increasingly conscious to the patient, but not yet fully integrated.
During the working-through process, Dewald goes on, the 
therapist’s job is to present his formulations in a form which will 
make the most sense to the patient, and permit the greatest degree of 
developing insight and expanding ego integration.
The point has been made that insight alone has no magic qualities. 
It does not produce therapeutic change unless the patient is able to 
develop and integrate new patterns of behavior, adaptation and ultimate 
internal modification on the basis of this new knowledge and under­
standing. Thus another important element in the process of working- 
through is the attempt which the patient makes to modify and change 
himself or his situation on the basis of his increasing insight. And 
the way in which the therapist intervenes in response to such attempts 
by the patient will significantly influence how effective they are.
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Concerning the question of working-through and its function, 
Sandler et al. (67) comment that for Freud, working-through represented 
the work entailed (for both analyst and patient) in overcoming resis­
tances to change due to the tendency for the instinctual drives to 
cling to accustomed patterns of discharge. Working-through represented 
analytic work which was additional to that involved in uncovering 
conflicts and resistances. Intellectual insight without working-through 
was not regarded as sufficient for the therapeutic task.
Kris (37) pointed out that the work of interpretation leads 
eventually to reconstruction of the patient’s past, and an aspect of 
working-through is the need to apply these reconstructions to many 
different areas and levels of the patient’s material.
Greenson (25) arrives at a definition of working-through centered 
around insight and change. "We do not regard the analytic work as 
worked through before the patient has insight, only after." It is 
the goal of working-through to make insight effective, i.e. to make 
significant and lasting changes in the patient. Analyses of these 
resistances which keep insight from leading to change is the work of 
working-through. Working-through is essentially the repetition, 
deepening and extension of the analysis of the resistances.
The relationship of working-through to insight, in contemporary 
psychoanalysis, is not clear, even contradictory. On the one hand, 
Greenson claims that the process of working-through starts only after 
insight has been gained. On the other, Fromm-Reichman (22) stresses 
the point that insight is the outcome of the process of working-through.
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According to Fromm-Reichman, the disassociated and repressed material 
which reveals itself to a patient under treatment in various connections 
must be tied together and worked through repeatedly, until awareness 
and understanding are finally transformed into constructive and cura­
tive insight into the basic patterns of the patient’s interpersonal 
experiences.
Intellectual understanding of an interpretation is not at all 
identical with a therapeutically valid grasp of its meaning. Even if 
the transformation of intellectual understanding into a living emotional 
acceptance of some piece of interpretive clarification has been 
successfully accomplished, this generally will still not constitute 
change and recover. Any understanding, any new awareness which has 
been gained by interpretive clarification, has to be reconquered and 
tested time and again in new connections and contacts with other inter­
locking experiences. The intellectual and rational grasp of one 
interpretation of a single experience, as a rule, will be changed 
only by the process of "working-through" into the type of integrated 
creative understanding, which deserves to be termed insight. The 
process of "working-through" is aimed at the changing of awareness 
and rational understanding of the unknown motivations and implications 
of any singled-out experience into creative, that is, therapeutically 
effective, insight.
If one adopts Fromra-Reichman’s description, it seems that 
"working-through" is the process, and insight is only the outcome. 
Fromra-Reichman, like many others, utilizes the concept of awareness 
which in many cases is a substitute for insight. Awareness seems to
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mean the acceptance and absorption, intellectually and emotionally, 
of unconscious material by the conscious. This process, according 
to Freud, signifies insight. Fromm-Reichman attaches to insight the 
connotation of functioning as an implication of this awareness in 
order to further the process of creative understanding. Would it be 
correct to assume that the ultimate function of creative thinking is 
to test or imply the new awareness in experiences? If so, insight 
becomes useful only after the therapeutic process succeeds in 
achieving its aim.
As to the means of achieving insight, Bibring (9) offers the 
distinction between insight through clarification and insight through 
interpretation. According to him, clarification does not refer to 
unconscious material but to conscious or preconscious processes of 
which the patient is not sufficiently aware, which escape his 
attention but which he recognizes more or less readily when they are 
clearly presented to him.
Insight through interpretation is dynamically different from 
insight obtained through clarification. Whereas clarification results 
in the detachment of the ego, interpretation causes the ego at first 
to become more involved, since it leads to the reactivation of painful 
tendencies, memories and conflicts. The effects of insight through 
clarification consist in "strengthening" the ego through greater 
objectivity whereas insight through interpretation initiates a process 
of reorientation and learning which results in more adequate solutions 
of the pathogenic infantile conflicts.
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There seems to develop a general trend to shift the emphasis 
from insight through interpretation toward "experiential manipulation"; 
that is, learning from experience seems to become the supreme agent - 
rather than insight through interpretation.
In contrast to Freud’s emphasis on the importance of revealing 
the unconscious through the psychoanalytic process, Kubie (39) stresses 
the functions of the preconscious level. He says: "A primary
determinant of the therapeutic effectiveness of insight is the extent 
to which insight becomes part of the stream of preconscious processing 
of all data, and that a secondary determinant in the outcome of the 
incessant struggle between preconscious insights and the unconscious 
rewards for rejecting insights."
The major concept is that of the brain as an information machine 
which functions predominantly on a preconscious level. The formation 
of our conscious symbolic process is primarily to sample this incessant 
flow of complex preconscious activities to ruminate and communicate 
about it, and to subject it to reality testing. Sometimes the relation­
ship of the conscious symbol to what it represents becomes distorted 
or lost. This is a manifestation of that neurotogenic process which 
in one context can be called "dissociation", and in another "repression", 
which leads to unconscious conflicts, affects, concepts. There is 
evidence that in man, most conditioning occurs on a preconscious level, 
and that this in fact constitutes the basic instrument of learning, 
since both the acquisition and designation and elaboration of data 
occur on a preconscious level. The preconscious processing of new
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in s ig h t  in to  a re a s  o f experience  which had h i th e r to  been unconscious 
i s  only  a s p e c ia l  in s ta n ce  of th e  g e n e ra l p ro cess  of p reconsc ious 
le a rn in g . No in s ig h t  can be e f f e c t iv e  u n t i l  and u n le ss  i t  i s  p rocessed  
p re c o n sc io u s ly . Our "co nsc ious’' in s ig h ts  a re  only fragm entary , 
w eighted , sym bolic samples of th e  stream  of p reconsc ious in s ig h t .
K ub ie 's  argum ents seem v a lu a b le , v i z . ,  t h a t  th e  p ro cess  of 
le a rn in g  b a s ic a l ly  ta k es  p lace  in  th e  p reconsc ious l e v e l ,  and in s ig h t  
i s  m an ifested  in  th e  p reconscious l e v e l ,  and i s  m ainly "a s p e c ia l  
in s ta n c e  o f th e  g e n e ra l p rocess o f th e  p reco n sc io u s  le a rn in g ."  We 
w i l l  l a t e r  r e tu r n  to  d e a l w ith  t h i s  l in e  of th o u g h t.
Many contem porary p sych o an a ly sts  d ea l w ith  th e  " in te g r a t iv e " ,  
" re o rg a n iza to ry "  a sp e c t of in s ig h t .  Regarding t h i s  a sp e c t of in s ig h t ,  
Myerson (51) says th a t  th e  p ro cess  o f r e in te g r a t io n  which fo llow s 
m eaningful se lf-a w a re n e ss  i s  a t  th e  core of th e  changes which occur 
th rough p sy ch o a n a ly s is . A h igh  o rd e r of an teced en t r e in te g r a t io n  of 
th e  p e r s o n a l i ty  s t r u c tu r e  i s  a p r e r e q u is i te  fo r  th e  mode o f s e l f ­
o b serv a tio n  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  p sy ch o an a ly tic  in s ig h t .  M eaningful s e l f -  
o b se rv a tio n  i s  fo llow ed  by f u r th e r  r e in te g r a t io n .
In one of h is  s tu d ie s ,  K ris (37) d e sc r ib e s  conv incing ly  th a t  
what he c a l l s  a "good a n a ly t ic  hour" , in  which r e a l  in s ig h t  i s  
ach ieved , i s  th e  r e s u l t  o f a long  drawn-out p ro cess  in  which "en e rg ie s  
a tta c h e d  to  th e  re p re sse d  m a te r ia l  have been s e t  f r e e " ,  and he say s: 
"The re o rg a n iz a tio n  which ta k e s  p la c e  i s  th e  essence  of th e  a n a ly t ic  
p ro cess  w ith  i t s  v ic is s i tu d e s  and changing f a c e t s .  As p a r t  o f th i s  
re o rg a n iz a tio n , some o f th e  e n e rg ie s  s e t  f r e e  a re  a t  th e  d isp o sa l of 
th e  ego ."  We w i l l  add: a t  th e  d is p o sa l of th e  autonomous ego
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functions. The ego’s basic function is mastery of impulses through 
integration.
This is reinforced by Alexander (l), who adds that by the 
interpretative work the analyst assists the patient’s ego to integrate 
the new material liberated from repression. Making conscious, how­
ever, what was hitherto repressed requires the reduction of anxiety. 
This is achieved not only by the corrective emotional experience, 
but also be insight which in itself has an anxiety-reduction effect.
The ego’s function is mastery through insight. The integration 
function is based on the appraisal of the total situation - both 
internal and external. Interpretative work increases the ego’s self- 
confidence in dealing with newly uncovered material. Something a 
person understands loses its threatening quality; understanding means 
mastery.
To summarize the curative process in psychoanalysis, it can be 
said that if behavior disorders could be interpreted as symbolic 
expression of or defenses against repressed unconscious motives, then 
it seems reasonable to expect complete cure as soon as the patient 
could be made to appreciate the motivation underlying his symptoms 
(insight). When this failed to happen in all but a few dramatic cases, 
analysis explained that intellectual understanding was insufficient 
and that emotional acceptance and practical application of insight to 
current life situations ("working-through") were also necessary. 
Emotional acceptance, they argued, was facilitated by chatharsis of 
the effect involved in the repressed complex; and since the source
of such complexes supposedly resided in childhood psychosexual 
development, chatharsis could be best effected therapeutically by 
a "transference" relationship in which the therapist plays the role 
of parent figure to re-elicit the expression of repressed childhood 
motives and attitudes. These additional techniques do not invalidate 
the crucial role of insight but merely implement it. Much effort 
has been invested by psychoanalysts in investigating and elaborating 
the phenomenon of insight in the therapeutic process. Its basic 
characteristics still elude us, and we are still far from being 
sufficiently equipped in order to explain how it occurs. Nevertheless, 
one should point out the fact that psychoanalysis deals - within its 
own frame of reference - with the "what" of insight, viz. its contents.
At this stage of our partial knowledge, it seems mandatory to 
admit the existence of difficulties, and to point out the questions 
which should be posed, so that in a future, when we are better equipped 
to deal with them, satisfactory answers will be found.
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CHAPTER I I I
INSIGHT IN CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY
R o g e rs ’ th e o ry  grow s, d evelops and re a c h e s  i t s  a b s t r a c t  fo rm u la ­
t i o n s  ou t o f  h i s  accum ula ted  p e r s o n a l  th e r a p e u t i c  e x p e r ie n c e s . One 
can o b serv e  a c e r t a in  c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n  w hich e x i s t s  betw een th e  
two - h i s  th e o ry  and e x p e r ie n c e . R ogers has b een  in f lu e n c e d , p h i l ­
o s o p h ic a l ly ,  by th e  A m erican h e r i t a g e :  th e  p o s i t iv is m  w hich re g a rd s
human n a tu re  a s  b e in g  b a s i c a l l y  good and s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g ,  and th e  
d em o cra tic  p r in c i p le s  w hich a re  founded  on man’s f r e e  w i l l .  In  h i s  
th e r a p e u t i c  th e o ry  and p r a c t i c e  th e s e  p r in c i p le s  s e rv e  a s  g u id e l in e s .  
R o g e rs ’ fu n d am en ta l assum ption  i s  t h a t  man has th e  ten d en cy  t o  a c t u a l i z e  
h is  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ,  and t h a t  th e s e  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  a re  in  th e  s e r v ic e  
o f  th e  m ain tenance  and enhancem ent o r  en rich m en t o f  h i s  l i f e  and s o c i a l  
l i v in g  a s  w e l l .  The p s y c h o lo g ic a l  form s o f th e  a c tu a l i z in g  te n d en cy  
i s  th e  te n d e n c y  to w ard  s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n  ( s e l f - c o n c e p t ) :  th e  need
f o r  p o s i t i v e  re g a rd  (a c c e p ta n c e  by im p o rta n t o th e r s )  and th e  need  f o r  
s e l f - p o s i t i v e - r e g a r d  (a c c e p ta n c e  by o n e s e l f ) .  I f  th e  in d iv id u a l  i s  
fa c e d  w ith  c o n d it io n s  o f  w o rth , h is  s e l f - c o n c e p t  w i l l  be c h a r a c te r iz e d  
by f e e l in g s  o f  u n w o rth in e ss , and th e  d e fe n s iv e  b e h a v io r  w i l l  be in  
o p e r a t io n .  I f ,  on th e  o th e r  hand , th e  in d iv id u a l  e x p e rie n c e s  an 
atm osphere o f u n c o n d i t io n a l  p o s i t i v e  r e g a rd ,  th e n  he w i l l  n o t develop  
d e fe n s iv e n e s s .  H is s e l f - c o n c e p t  w i l l  be b ro a d e r ,  f l e x i b l e  and open t o
change
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Rogers (63) says: "One aspect of ’the good life* is a movement
away from the pole of defensiveness toward the pole of openness to 
experience. The individual is becoming more able to listen to him­
self, to experience what is going on within himself. He is free to 
live his feelings subjectively, as they exist in him, and also free 
to be aware of these feelings." The fully-functioning person has the 
feeling of mastery and power upon his life: what happens depends on
him. Rogers goes on to say: "The process of living the good life
involves a wider range, a greater richness than the constricted living 
in which most of us find ourselves. To be part of this process means 
that one is involved in the frequently frightening and frequently 
satisfying experience of a more sensitive living, with greater range, 
greater variety, greater richness. It seems to me that clients who 
have moved significantly in therapy live more intimately with their 
feelings of pain, but also more vividly with their feelings of ecstasy: 
that anger is more clearly felt, but also is love . . • The reason they 
can thus live fully in a wider range is that they have this underlying 
confidence in themselves as trustworthy instruments for encountering 
life . . . The good life involves the stretching and growing of 
becoming more and more of one’s potentialities."
The nondirective approach lays a particular stress upon 
emotional elements in the therapeutic relationship. By providing the 
three conditions, that according to Rogers are both necessary and 
sufficient in order to effect a therapeutic change, namely warmth, 
empathy and congruence, the therapist acts as a potent eliciter of 
feelings and attitudes. In this climate of acceptance the patient 
provides his own learning situation, dependent wholly upon the
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individual’s capacity for growth. The central hypothesis of non­
directive therapy holds that if the therapist "can provide under­
standing of the way the client seems to himself at this (each) 
moment, he can do the rest." McCary (48) explains that when Rogers 
counts the characteristic steps in the therapeutic process he 
mentions that insight, the understanding of the self and acceptance 
of the self, is one of the most important aspects of the whole 
process. Intermingled with the process of insight is the process 
of clarification of possible decisions, possible courses of action.
In his 1942 book, Rogers has a chapter (6l) entitled, "The 
Achievement of Insight", and in the tradition of most inquiries into 
psychotherapy, he devotes considerable attention to clarifying the 
role of self-understanding in the process of therapy. In his book of 
ten years later, his chapter title was dropped out, and insight is 
mentioned only incidentally here and there through the book. There is 
no explicit treatment of insight, nor is there developed an argument 
for its omission. One only surmises that the concept has tended to 
drop out, because it was not very useful.
When Rogers (60) treats the concept of insight, he describes 
it as the perception of new meaning in the individual’s own experience, 
seeing new relationships of cause and effect, gaining new understanding 
of the meaning which behavior symptoms have had, understanding the 
patterning of one’s behavior. This learning, he says, constitutes 
insight.
^5
Insight and self-understanding are most effective, according to 
Rogers, when they arise spontaneously. The counsellor can aid this 
process by reformulating insight already achieved, by clarifying the 
new understanding at which the client has arrived. He may suggest 
relationships or patterns of reaction which seem to be evident in 
the material which the client has freely produced. Here Rogers 
follows the main stream by emphasizing the importance of understanding, 
though he argues that this understanding will be effective only if the 
client arrives at it by himself spontaneously. Then he adds that 
understanding alone is not enough and what is needed is "experiencing". 
As to the role of insight in therapy, Rogers goes on to elaborate 
that, "There can be no doubt that in many instances insight has this 
sort of meaning to the client, a process of becoming sufficiently 
free to look at old facts in a new way, an experience of discovering 
new relationships among familiar attitudes, a willingness to accept 
the implications of well-known material. Insight cannot be gained 
from being talked to: it is an experience which the client achieves. 
Such instances of insight are but steps in the total process of better 
self-understanding. Insight comes gradually, bit by bit, as the 
individual develops sufficient psychological strength to endure new 
perceptions. The development of insight often involves not only the 
recognition of the role which the individual is playing, but also 
the recognition of repressed impulses within the self. So long as 
the individual denies certain attitudes which he finds within himself, 
so long will he keep up compensatory attitudes of a defensive character.
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When he can fa c e  c l e a r ly ,  and can a c c e p t a s  a p a r t  o f h im s e lf ,  th e s e  
l e s s  p ra is e w o r th y  f e e l in g s ,  th e  need  f o r  d e fe n s iv e  r e a c t io n s  te n d s  
t o  d is a p p e a r .  The m eaning o f  in s ig h t  t o  th e  c l i e n t  may be d e s c r ib e d  
in  d i f f e r e n t  ways in  d i f f e r e n t  in s ta n c e s .  I t  may mean th e  p e rc e p tio n  
o f  new r e l a t i o n s h ip s  betw een o ld  f a c t s ,  o r i t  may mean th e  fa c in g  and 
a c c e p ta n c e  o f  th e  r e p re s s e d  a t t i t u d e s  and im p u lse s . R e o r ie n ta t io n  
and r e o r g a n iz a t io n  o f th e  s e l f  i s  th e  m ajor aim o f  c o u n s e l l in g .  The 
p rim ary  te c h n iq u e  i s  t o  encourage th e  e x p re s s io n  o f a t t i t u d e s  and 
f e e l in g s  u n t i l  i n s i g h t f u l  u n d e rs ta n d in g  ap p ea rs  sp o n ta n e o u s ly . The 
m ain aim o f  th e  c o u n s e l lo r  i s  to  a s s i s t  th e  c l i e n t  t o  drop any 
d e fe n s iv e n e s s ,  and  to  encourage him to  e x p re ss  h im se lf  f r e e l y  w ith o u t 
f e a r in g  c r i t i c i s m  o r  judgm ent. Only when th e  c l i e n t  i s  f r e e  t o  lo o k  
a t  th e  t o t a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  i t s  r e a l i t y ,  w ith o u t h av in g  t o  p r o te c t  
h im s e lf ,  can  he d is c o v e r  th e  r e l a t io n s h ip s  c l e a r l y ,  and re c o g n iz e  
th e  h id d en  im p u lses  w ith in  h im s e l f . ”
A usubel (7 ) d e a ls  w ith  th e  r o le  o f  p e r c e p tu a l  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  in  
c l i e n t - c e n t e r e d  th e ra p y ,  as  w e ll  as  w ith  th e  c r u c i a l  p a r t  o f  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h ip  betw een c l i e n t  and t h e r a p i s t .  He say s  t h a t  n o n - d ir e c t iv e  
t h e r a p i s t s  s t r e s s  th e  r o le  o f p e rc e p tu a l  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  th ro u g h  i n ­
s ig h t ,  b u t d ec ry  t h e r a p i s t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  ex ce p t f o r  th e  p u rp o se  o f 
r e f l e c t i o n  and c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f th e  c l i e n t* s  f e e l i n g s .  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
and t r a n s f e r e n c e  a r e  ta b o o , and a t t e n t i o n  i s  fo cu sed  on c u r re n t  
c o n f l i c t s  a p a r t  from  th e  developm ent o r ig i n s .  I t  i s  c la im ed  t h a t  
em o tio n a l a c c e p ta n c e  o f in s ig h t  i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  by  th e  c r e a t io n  o f 
a p e rm is s iv e  atm osphere  w hich m in im izes r e s i s t a n c e  t o  change, by
emphasis upon self-discovery of underlying attitudes and motivations, 
and by emotional relatedness on the part of the therapist to the 
client. Acceptance of the therapeutic value of insight does not 
imply acceptance of the theory that all neurotic symptoms reflect 
the operation of repression and unconscious motivation. Many 
neurotic symptoms can occur with complete possession of insight; and 
lack of conscious accessibility is not necessarily a precondition for 
lack of insight, since oftentimes, the relation of symptoms to 
conscious motives is not appreciated. Hence, it is unrealistic to 
accept that the acquisition of insight can by itself repair lack of 
self-esteem or create feelings of security and adequacy. The per­
ceptual reorganization achieved as a result of insight does not 
represent absolute and unconditional change, but change which is 
stable in relation to a given amount of adjustive stress. Let the 
degree of stress increase, and retrogression of the former level of 
insight may readily occur.
Ford and Urban (l8) point out that the non-directive therapeutical 
situation provides the client with learning experiences. They refer to 
Rogers' three principles which govern the acquisition of behavior: 
response arousal, response avoidance and contiguity of awareness. 
Behavior sequences that are followed by positive affects (response 
arousal) become habitual; they satisfy the actualizing tendency.
Those that are followed by negative affects tend not to be repeated 
(response termination). The crucial situational events which seem 
most likely to be followed by affective responses are the behaviors
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of other people, particularly their approvals and disapprovals. Thus, 
interpersonal situations represent a powerful learning situation. Any 
event that is attended to and symbolized in awareness can result in 
learned thought (contiguity of awareness). All learned behavior - the 
self-concept, the learned evaluing, the needs for positive regard 
and positive self-regard - can be modified by these learning principles. 
The patient has acquired faulty habits of attending to, identifying, 
thinking about and evaluating the raw data of his experiences. To 
correct this, the patient has to start over with the raw data and 
rebuild more accurate habits of awareness and thoughts. By noticing 
and thinking accurately about such events, the patient can reconcile 
the contradictions and thus remove, reduce or control the antecedents 
of anxiety. If anxiety does not occur, the symptomatic consequences 
will disappear. Rogers and others hold that progress in therapy is 
characterized by an "increased differentiation of the perceptual field" 
or by the process of learning in which the individual abandons gross 
and often inaccurate abstractions regarding his life-circumstances 
for more specific and accurate formulations, with a consequent increase 
in the appropriateness of his behavior.
Client-centered therapy rejects the importance that has been 
attached to interpretation as being the main procedure inducing effect 
in the therapeutic process. Some such therapists express their extreme 
reservation by claiming that the more accurate the interpretation, the 
more likely it is to encounter defensive resistance. Psychoanalysts, 
on the other hand, will argue that the interpretation should be
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p re sen te d , to  th e  c l i e n t  on ly  when he i s  f u l l y  read y  to  a c c e p t i t ,  
w hich  means th e  tim in g  o f  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  v e ry  c r u c i a l  t o  i t s  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  Once th e  c l i e n t  i s  w e ll -p re p a re d ,  th e  " a c c u ra te  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  n o t l i k e l y  t o  en c o u n te r  d e fe n s iv e  r e s i s t a n c e ."
R ogers (64) m en tions t h a t  under c e r t a i n  c o n d i t io n s  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  
t o  i n t e r p r e t  t o  th e  c l i e n t  some o f  th e  m a te r ia l  w hich he h as  been  
r e v e a l in g .  When th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  b a se d  e n t i r e l y  upon s ta te m e n ts  
w hich  th e  c l i e n t  has made, and when th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  m ere ly  a 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f w hat th e  c l i e n t  has a l re a d y  p e rc e iv e d  f o r  h im s e lf ,  
t h i s  ty p e  o f  app roach  can be s u c c e s s f u l .  But even Rogers h im se lf  
ad m its  t h a t  th e  te c h n iq u e s  w hich th e  c o u n s e l lo r  u ses  t o  prom ote 
i n s ig h t  a re  s u b t l e ,  and th e  l i n e  betw een s u c c e s s fu l  and u n s u c c e s s fu l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  draw .
R ogers s t r o n g ly  opposes F reud*s p o s i t i o n  t h a t  " re a so n  can be 
c u re d  by r e a s o n " .  A ccord ing  t o  him , t h i s  p ro p o s i t io n  e x h ib i t s  th e  
n a iv e  f a i t h  t h a t  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  e x p la n a tio n  o f th e  d i f f i c u l t y  w ould 
r e s u l t  in  changed a t t i t u d e s  and f e e l i n g s .  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  has v a lu e  
o n ly  to  th e  e x te n t  t h a t  i t  i s  a c c e p te d  and a s s im i la te d  by th e  c l i e n t .
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  a l s o  d e a l t  w ith  by A rbuck le ( 6 ) ,  who says t h a t  
" th e  c l i e n t - c e n t e r e d  c o u n s e l lo r  i s  l i t t l e  concerned  w ith  in s ig h t  a s  
i n t e r p r e t e d  in  te rm s o f i n t e l l e c t u a l  u n d e rs ta n d in g . He i s  concerned  
i f  i t  i s  t o  be r e l a t e d  w ith  p ro c e s s e s ,  i f  i t  i s  to  be an e x p e r ie n c in g , 
a l i v i n g ,  a b e in g  a g a in  w ith  r e a l  and  deep f e e l in g s .  Thus th e  
in s ig h t f u ln e s s  o f  th e  c l i e n t  may in c lu d e  th e  e x p e r ie n c in g  a g a in , b u t 
t h i s  tim e  in  th e  p re se n c e  o f someone who c a re s  and i s  con ce rn ed , 
nam ely th e  t h e r a p i s t . "
50
In other words, the therapist encounters the phenomenon of 
transference that has been regarded by the psychoanalysts to be one 
of their main means. Rogers does not ignore the fact that trans­
ference does occur in therapy, but he tries to minimize its importance 
by pointing out that transference should be dealt with by the therapist 
in a way similar to all other reactions that are brought up by the 
client. By avoiding special treatment and attention to the phenomenon, 
the client is discouraged from developing over-dependence on the 
therapist and he is led to rely on his own resources in a process of 
growth.
Rogers (6o) emphasizes the perception of relationships. "Various 
phrases have been used by different writers in discussing insight. It 
involves the reorganization of the perceptual field. It consists in 
seeing new relationships. It is the integration of accumulated 
experience. It signifies a reorientation of the self. All these 
statements would seem to be true. All lay sound emphasis upon the 
fact that insight is essentially a new way of perceiving . . .  In 
insight there is the perception of the related nature of previously 
known facts (sometimes reorganized as the "Aha"). This type of 
perception is possible in therapy only when the individual is freed 
from defensiveness through the process of catharsis. It is only in 
such a state of emotional release that a reorganization of the per­
ceptual field can take place. Experience indicates that the intellec­
tual approach (telling the client of these relationships) is futile. 
Emotional as well as intellectual acceptance is needed. The spontaneous
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development of these new perceptions is likely to he the most rapid 
road to insight. The acceptance of self is the perception of the 
related nature of all impulses. The accepting atmosphere of the 
counselling situation makes it much easier for the individual to 
recognize all attitudes and impulses • . . Genuine insight includes 
the positive choice of more satisfying goals, "the creative will". 
Insight generally involves a choice between goals which give immediate 
and temporary satisfaction, and those which offer delayed, but more 
permanent, satisfactions. As insight is developing, as the decisions 
are made which orient the client about new goals, these decisions 
tend to be implemented by actions which move the client in the 
direction of the new goals."
The crucial element in the therapeutic process, (according to 
Rogers), is the emotional experience due to the unique situation of 
therapy, based upon the special relationships provided by the therapist. 
This had been already pointed out, even earlier, by the neo-analysts.
Adler (in 5) is the first psychotherapist who placed high value 
on the social relationship between the therapist and the patient.
He believes that this relationship can serve as a re-educative bridge 
to other relationships. Adler sees the therapist's task as helping 
the individual to substitute realistic for unrealistic life-goals, 
and to instill social interest and feeling.
Rank (in 18) is a pioneer in emphasizing the importance of the 
interpersonal relationship between patient and therapist. The therapist 
should share with, encourage or permit the patient to take lead in the
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interview. The locus of responsibility and evaluation has to be in 
the patient. Rank’s therapy is intended to bring the patient to self- 
help, in contrast with the analytic methods which - he believed - 
forced the patient to accept help from others. He emphasizes the 
flexible, adaptable, individual, patient-centered nature of the 
therapeutic process. He rebels against the rigid pre-determined 
nature of the therapeutic process. He rebels against the rigid pre­
determined notions of the content of each analysis. Every relation­
ship between patient and therapist should be a unique and creative 
process, and the patient - not the therapist - should point the way 
to his particular method of achieving self determination and self 
direction. This conception is based on the capacity of the individual 
to take an active part in the process of change, and to set its goals, 
on the one hand, and on the other it points to the therapist’s share 
in the creation of conditions and the active assistance offered in 
order to achieve them. From here to the conception of the client- 
centered therapy the distance is not far indeed.
In summary, Rogers believed that insight in psychotherapy had 
little to do with formal understanding but was defined by awareness 
of experience. Anything resembling interpretation or explanation 
was clearly anathema to him - on the contrary, he insisted that such 
procedures were inimical to the development of real growth in 
experiencing. Rogers was quite explicit in his definition of insight: 
". . . insight is essentially a new way of perceiving". This new way 
of perceiving was, for Rogers, both the foundation and the result of
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new learning. But this learning had little to do with intellectual 
presentation. What promotes insight was, in Rogers' eyes, the 
employment of what he called "the primary technique": "The primary
technique which leads to insight on the part of the client is one 
which demands the utmost of self-restraint on the counselor's part, 
rather than the utmost of action. The primary technique is to 
encourage the expression of attitudes and feelings . . . until 
insightful understanding appears spontaneously. Insight is often 
delayed, and sometimes made impossible, by efforts of the counselor 
to create it or to bring it about. It is probably not delayed, and 
certainly never made impossible, by those interviewing approaches 
which encourage full expression of attitudes." (6o).
Rogers modified somewhat his early position, although he did 
not change his position that insight is fundamentally the development 
of self-acceptance, of accepting one's attitudes, feelings, and 
experiences•
As we have pointed out earlier, most of Rogers* comments on the 
subject of insight appear in the early stage of his theoretical 
construction. As he progresses, it seems that insight was dropped, 
because it had been absorbed by other dominant concepts used to 
describe the therapeutic process, such as "experiencing", or "awareness 
of experience" which come to describe the full grasp of the experience 
on all levels. By providing the client with a suitable learning 
situation which is based on the unconditional positive regard, the 
client will be free and reinforced to experience and reveal within
himself the positive sources for growth, which will eventually ful­
fill the tendency of self-actualization. Would it be right to assume 
that the key-concept of experiencing is quite similar to the concept 
of insight, if the latter is conceptualized in the broader manner as 
being combined of emotional and intellectual components? If this 
assumption is accepted, one is faced with the same unanswered question 
as to the "what" and "why" in insight or "experiencing". It seems 
that Rogers' contribution can be found in his formulations of the 
basic conditions which are necessary to the occurrence of insight, 
awareness or experiencing. These three conditions, viz. warmth, 
empathy and congruence, which are provided to the client by the 




AWARENESS IN GESTALT THERAPY
I t  i s  ve ry  o f te n  t h a t  th e  concept o f awareness i s  used alm ost 
synonymously to  in s ig h t .  Some contem porary w r i te r s  p re fe r  t h i s  term  
to  in s ig h t ,  because in  some way i t  may s u i t  b e t t e r  t h e i r  frames of 
re fe re n c e . In  e x i s t e n t i a l  th e ra p y , fo r  example, which i s  no t t r e a te d  
h e re , aw areness i s  a key concep t.
I t  seems to  be w orthw hile to  to u ch  here  on th a t  new th e o ry  and 
method in  th e ra p y , th e  G e s ta lt  th e ra p y , which i s  based  alm ost e x c lu s i 
v e ly  on th e  concept o f "aw areness". I t s  founder and c h ie f  advocate , 
F . S . P e r is  (55, 56) has been q u ite  w e ll known in  th e  U nited S ta te s  
fo r  h is  th e o ry  and p r a c t ic e ,  b u t u n t i l  r e c e n tly  only few o f h is  
w ritin g s  were p u b lish e d .
G e s ta l t  th e ra p y  i s  a unique com bination o f b e h a v io ra l and 
phenom enological f a c to r s .  I t s  th e o ry  i s  a v a r ia t io n  d e riv ed  from 
e x i s t e n t i a l  ph ilo so p h y , which la y s  heavy s t r e s s  on th e  im portance of 
awareness as a s u b je c tiv e  ex p erien ce , o ccu rrin g  in  th e  p re s e n t .  The 
"G e s ta lt"  r e f e r s  to  th e  b a s ic  p r in c ip le  th a t  any u n fin ish e d  or 
unclosed  s i tu a t io n  o r s t r u c tu r e  w i l l  always reap p ear in  th e  awareness 
so th a t  th e  organism  can proceed  tow ard a com pletion of th e  G e s ta l t .  
In  o rder to  ach ieve  t h i s  ta s k ,  a c o n tin u ity  o f awareness i s  e s s e n t ia l  
Only in  a s t a t e  o f continuous aw areness can th e  in d iv id u a l complete 
th e  G e s ta l ts  t h a t  occur w ith in  h im se lf . I f  th e  in d iv id u a l den ies 
h im se lf t h i s  com pletion  o f aw areness, h is  fu n c tio n in g  w i l l  be harmed,
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h is  a b i l i t y  to  f e e l ,  th in k  and a c t  w i l l  be burdened by th e  u n fin ish e d , 
unclosed  s i tu a t io n  th a t  w i l l  demand t h e i r  com pletion .
The p ro cess  o f aw areness seems to  be a sim ple one. C h ild ren  
a re  e x c e p tio n a lly  good a t  i t ,  and t h i s  i s  why th ey  a re  capable  of 
ex p erien c in g  joy  and sorrow : th ey  a re  ab le  to  absorb th e  w orld
surround ing  them, and th ey  a re  ab le  to  ach ieve motor c o n tro l over 
t h e i r  b o d ie s . The grown-ups have l o s t  t h i s  n a tu ra l  a b i l i t y .  Due to  
aw areness, ex p erien ces  a re  absorbed or accep ted  as p a r t  of th e  ego.
A G e s ta lt  which reaches i t s  com pletion i s  accep ted  as a p a r t  of th e  
organism , i s  a s s im ila te d  in to  i t :  t h i s  p ro cess  ep itom izes th e  r e a l
meaning o f grow th.
Four le v e ls  o f human behav io r can be d is tin g u is h e d : m otor,
sen so ry , em otional and m en ta l. P e r i s '  a t t i tu d e  tow ards th e se  fu n c tio n s  
i s  very  c le a r :  th e  motor ex p ress io n  i s  th e  b a s ic ,  pure and honest one;
i t  i s  th rough  i t  th a t  t r u e  experiences a re  ex p ressed . The motor 
ex p re ss io n  can be o b je c t iv e ly  observed and body language i s  th e  prim ary 
source of in fo rm a tio n . The in te rn a l iz e d  p sy ch o lo g ica l le v e ls  - f e e l in g s ,  
em otions, th in k in g  -  a re  developed, in  a person  who i s  a p roduct of 
W estern c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  in  an unbalanced manner: we depend m ostly  on 
m ental and i n t e l l e c t u a l  endeavors, and n e g le c t our a b i l i t y  to  absorb  
and f e e l .  As a r e s u l t ,  our senses d eg en e ra te . The a d u lt  in d iv id u a l 
i s  p a r t ly  p a ra ly ze d  and can be observed as a one-d im ensional c r e a tu r e .  
According to  L ie b lic h  ( 1+3 )  > th e  goa l of G e s ta lt  th e rap y  i s  to  b r in g  
back to  l i f e  th e se  a b i l i t i e s  which have degenera ted , and to  u t i l i z e  
them f u l l y .  As a r e s u l t ,  th e  in d iv id u a l should  be ab le  to  grow and
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assimilate himself in both the external and the internal worlds.
The healthy individual is one within whom exists a constant stream 
of movements between the organism and the environment; whose each 
Gestalt is fully expressed and leaves room for the following one; 
all his behavioral levels are developed in a balanced manner. Such 
a person acquires, according to Peris, a center or focus, which 
enable him to make use of his own resources, feel free from dependence 
and support from the outside. Psychopathology is characterized as a 
situation in which many Gestalts remain uncompleted; awareness is 
cut off; responsibility is avoided; and support from the outside is 
looked for. Gestalt therapy suggests a series of experiences for 
expanding awareness. The therapist's task is to bring to the client's 
attention the means he used to cut off his awareness, and to teach 
him to complete structures, to use his senses in order to make out 
the information which is supplied by his body. The goal is not to 
solve problems, offer support or encouragement; rather, it is to bring 
the individual to open his eyes, lose his reason and turn to his senses 
The therapist should not provide the client with support or solution.
There is special significance to the use of the term "impasse". 
The existential "impasse" is a state in which no support is given to 
the individual from the outside and he is not able, or believes that 
he is unable, to struggle with life by means of using his own resources 
In such a state the avoidance of support can open to the individual new 
possibilities, so that he can stand up and, unsupported, step forward. 
The avoidance of support, especially in states of impasse, is one of
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the basic principles of the method. The other principle is avoidance 
of criticism: all experiences and discoveries which are brought up
by the client are accepted - if they are pure and honest - without 
attributing to them any value and without any moral judgment.
Out of the three main techniques which are used by Gestalt 
therapy (Rules, Games, Dream Analysis), dream analysis is of special 
interest to us. There are vast differences between the orthodox 
dream analysis and the one which is perceived by Gestalt therapy.
The dream, according to Peris, is a message sent by an individual 
to himself. This is why it is important to discover the content of 
this message and to accept it at the right time. While according to 
Freud, dreams are the main road to reach the unconsciousness, Peris 
stresses that "the dream is the main road to integration".
It seems that through dream analysis the client is given an 
opportunity to experience and to become aware of the contents of his 
messages, or, in other words, to gain some insight about himself. It 
would be appropriate to refer here to Kelman (35), whose description 
of dreams throws some light on their function. According to him, 
dreaming is a process. It is constituted of its many aspects, being 
created, remembered, communicated, worked with, experienced, integrated 
from its first emergence and through the many times it is in the fore­
ground of awareness with the many new dimensions of meaning being 
created on each occasion. The "what" question (not how and why) is to 
help the patient to experience more and more dimensions of his whatness 
and thereby their howness. While attending to the dream, affect-laden 
attitudes which constricted and colored the looking and seeing fall
59
in to  th e  background. A w ider, more r a t io n a l  v is io n  opens, making 
i t  p o s s ib le  to  see more c o n tra s ts  and parad o x es . Dreams a re  not th e  
main road  to  th e  unconscious, b u t one o f th e  b e s t  ways o f see in g  and 
h e lp in g  r e a l iz e  spontaneous w holeness. W hile dreaming we a re  c lo se r  
to  th e  t r u t h  o f o u rse lv e s , to  th e  t r u t h  o f our fa lseh o o d s , to  th e  
t r u t h  of be ing  human. The dreaming p ro cess  r e f l e c t s  a c c u ra te ly , 
a p p ro p r ia te ly  and ad eq u a te ly  th e  movements to  and from th e  t r u t h  of 
o u rs e lv e s . There i s  no s in g le  r ig h t  o r f i n a l  in te r p r e ta t io n  to  a 
dream. The meaning o f each dream i s  unique to  i t s  c o n te x t . The same 
symbol may mean d i f f e r e n t  th in g s  in  d i f f e r e n t  c o n te x ts . The main aim 
o f dream a n a ly s is  i s  to  widen and deepen h ere  - now e x p e rien c e s . A 
dream i s  an a s s o c ia t io n  l ik e  any a s s o c ia t io n ,  except th a t  i t  re q u ire s  
more a s s o c ia t io n s  fo r  i t s  meaning to  be ex p erien ced .
The dream i s  a m eeting ground between f ig u re s  which re p re se n t 
th e  s e p a ra te  p a r t s  o f th e  ego. Most o f th e  f ig u re s  th a t  appear in  
th e  dream a re  ego p r o je c t io n s .  The c o n fro n ta tio n  between th e  opposed 
f ig u re s  i s  th e  way to  accep t th e  o p p o site  p a r t s  o f th e  ego.
An a ttem p t has been made here  to  summarize some o f th e  contem porary 
l i t e r a t u r e  concern ing  G e s ta l t  th e ra p y . An e v a lu a tio n  and se r io u s  
c r i t ic i s m  w i l l  have to  be based  on re se a rc h  which i s  no t y e t a v a i la b le .
At p re se n t th e re  i s  no way o f weighing i t s  advantages or d isadvan tages 
over any o th e r  method o f  th e ra p y .
In s p i te  o f t h i s ,  i t  should  be o f i n t e r e s t  to  compare G e s ta lt  
th e ra p y  w ith  some o th e r  th e o r ie s  in  th e ra p y .
The psychodynamic sch o o l, e s p e c ia l ly  p sy ch o an a ly sis , r e f e r s  to  
th e  p a t ie n t  as be ing  s ic k .  He is  tak en  to  be no t re sp o n s ib le  fo r  h is
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condition. The therapist takes upon himself the main responsibility 
for directing the treatment. In this method treatment focuses on 
the past, and it attempts to achieve a causal verbal interpretation 
of the sources of illness. Behavior therapy starts with the symptom 
or disturbance and aims at disposing with them. The full responsi­
bility lies here, too, on the shoulders of the therapists, who attempt 
to employ on the client - as a passive organism - his behavioral 
methods. In these two respects there is great similarity between 
behavior therapy and the psychoanalytic school. But the difference 
between them lies in the area of behavior, and in the crucial period 
in which treatment is focused. In the behavioral method, the therapist 
identifies the disturbance with its external manifestations, as 
expressed in the present; and contrary to his colleague, the psycho­
analyst, he does not indulge in causal analysis, nor does he probe 
into the past, as background for the disturbance.
Humanistic therapy, founded by Maslow and Rogers, developed also 
as did behavior therapy - especially in the United States. It focuses 
on positive concepts, such as "growth”, or "self actualization". Most 
writers belonging to the humanistic school put the responsibility on 
the patient, who maintains with the therapist egalitarian relations of 
I-Thou (as formulated by Martin Buber) • The main medium, in this 
therapy, is awareness, which focuses on the subjective experience of 
the individual, as it happens in the present. In these respects one 
can view this approach as the opposite of psychoanalysis.
Gestalt therapy is one of the prominent streams in the humanistic 
existentialistic school in the United States. But it has some specific 
characteristics which are brought out in its definition as "behaviorist
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phenomenology"• As a phenomenology, Gestalt therapy represents the 
most extreme focusing in the awareness of the present, especially in 
the means taken by the individual in order to restrict this awareness.
One does not "talk about" or "tell a story" - the dominant subject in 
therapy is "what do you feel now". Instead of "talking about", a 
series of experiences is suggested, in order to "try on" several 
solutions, and, according to the patient's feelings at that moment, 
find out which is the most suitable solution. Gestalt therapy is also 
behaviorism, because it attaches primary importance to body language, 
movements, facial gestures and voices as reliable and meaningful 
sources of information about the individual. Gestalt therapy differs 
from the other systems in the same school in two negative principles: 
Unlike the other humanistic methods that are founded on the supportive 
aspect of therapy, the Gestalt therapy is non-supportive by its nature 
and does not ask for an harmonious atmosphere in the group (in the 
case of group therapy). Gestalt therapy assumes that the responsibility 
has to be vested in the client, while dependency on others prevents 
growth. The therapy does not place any special value on the group.
The latter is valuable only as a background for behavioral observations 
and for the development of awareness. All the activity which takes 
place in Gestalt therapy focuses on expanding present awareness. 
Functionally, awareness - as attention - is defined as a process 
which occurs only in the present, although its contents includes 
memories from the past or expectations as to the future. The therapist's 
task is to observe behavior, not to analyze it. There are differences
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between experiences in introspection and experiences in awareness.
During the process of introspection, the organism seems to be divided 
into two: one part is the observer, and the other is the observed.
During the process of experiencing in awareness, though at the 
beginning the individual tends to introspection, the gap between the 
observer and the observed is gradually closed and the individual 
reaches self-awareness. The Gestalt therapist stresses the distinction 
between sensual observations and cognitive assumptions. Gestalt 
therapy does not ask "why", only "what” and "how"; it avoids explana­
tions and interpretations; it guides the client in observing the 
occurrences of his internal and external processes.
Regardless of its techniques and its theoretical background 
(and even results), Gestalt therapy offers the client a unique 
emotional experience, dealing with his present problems in a very 
personal and emotional manner, helping him to reach the stage of 
self-awareness which leads to self-acceptance. Many will agree that 
their "awareness" and "experiences" are similar in various aspects to 
"insight" or at least to what is labeled as "emotional insight".
Gestalt therapy may differ from other systems in its frame of reference 
and methods, but basically it accepts the notion that in order to help 
a person one has to encourage him to face or recognize his sensations, 
feelings, emotions, and thoughts, which also means to collect all the 
data concerning these aspects - to complete the Gestalt - and put them 
together in a new, meaningful, way, so that "self-awareness" is achieved. 
Gestalt therapy shares with Rogers the belief in a human capacity of 
growth, reliable self-responsibility, and choice. It is not interested
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in  th e  u n d e rly in g  laws which govern human b eh av io r, bu t r a th e r  d ea ls  
w ith  th e  p re se n t co n ten t o f f e e l in g s  and re a c tio n s  in  a most d i r e c t  
and p e rso n a l way. I t  p re s e n ts  th e  c l i e n t  w ith  q u estio n s  reg a rd in g  




B ehavior th e o ry  neg a tes  th e  e x is te n c e  o f th e  mind, o r in n e r 
p ro c e sse s , in c lu d in g  in s ig h t .  Every re a c t io n  accord ing  to  th i s  
th e o ry  i s  a le a rn e d  one, th u s  must obey th e  laws of le a rn in g .
T h ere fo re , th e ra p y  i s  a le a rn in g  s i tu a t io n  governed by th e  same s e ts  
o f r u le s ,  and b e h a v io ra l change can be ach ieved  by u sin g  s tan d a rd  
s c i e n t i f i c  p rocedures which a re  d e riv ed  from th e  g en e ra l le a rn in g  
th e o ry . "B ehavior can be changed by changing th e  c o n d itio n s  of 
which i t  i s  a fu n c tio n ."
C urren t t re n d s  in  psychotherapy in c o rp o ra te  w ith in  i t s  frame 
o f re fe re n c e  t h i s  b a s ic  assum ption, th a t  th e ra p y  i s  a le a rn in g  
s i t u a t io n .  In  t h i s  s i tu a t io n  th e  c l i e n t  i s  p rov ided  w ith  o p p o rtu n itie s  
to  u n lea rn  m aladap tive  p a t te rn s  o f beh av io r and s u b s t i tu te  them w ith  
more a p p ro p r ia te  p a t t e r n s .  Thus, i t  i s  w orthw hile to  d iscu ss  here  
some o f th e  b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  o f le a rn in g  th e o ry  and to  examine how 
th e y  in te r lo c k  w ith  o th e r  P sy ch o th erap eu ti c a l  system s.
The b e h a v io r is ts  argue th a t  th e  th e o ry  o f in s t in c t iv e  m o tiv a tio n  
in  human beh av io r i s  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t .  T heir in t e r e s t  l i e s  
in  human e n g in ee rin g , o r -  acco rd ing  to  Skinner - "technology of 
b e h a v io r" •
Skinner ( 73> 74,  75) b e lie v e s  th a t  we can fo llow  th e  p a th  tak en  
by p h y sics  and b io lo g y  by tu rn in g  d i r e c t ly  to  th e  r e l a t io n  between 
beh av io r and th e  environm ent and n e g le c tin g  supposed m ed ia ting  s ta t e s
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of m ind. The ta s k s  o f th e  s c i e n t i f i c  a n a ly s is  i s  to  e x p la in  how th e  
b eh av io r of a person  as  a p h y s ic a l system i s  r e la te d  to  th e  co n d itio n  
under which th e  human sp ec ie s  evolved and th e  c o n d itio n s  under which 
th e  in d iv id u a l  l i v e s .  Skinner argues w ith  o th e r schoo ls of psychotherapy , 
say ing  th a t  most forms o f th e rap y  assume th a t  th e  p a t ie n t  i s  no t to  be 
to ld  how to  behave more e f f e c t iv e ly  o r g iven  d ir e c t io n s  fo r  so lv in g  
h is  problem s: a s o lu t io n  i s  a lre ad y  w ith in  him, and has only  to  be
drawn ou t w ith  th e  h e lp  o f th e  t h e r a p i s t .  B ut, says S k inner, a person  
never becomes t r u l y  s e l f - r e l i a n t .  Even though he d e a ls  e f f e c t iv e ly  
w ith  th in g s ,  he i s  n e c e s s a r i ly  dependent upon th o se  who have ta u g h t 
him to  do so . They have s e le c te d  th e  th in g s  he i s  dependent upon and 
determ ined  th e  k inds and degree o f dependencies. They cannot, th e r e ­
fo r e ,  d isc la im  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  th e  r e s u l t s .  As a m a tte r  of f a c t  
th o se  who o b je c t to  th e  m an ipu la tion  of beh av io r n e v e r th e le s s  make 
th e  most v igorous e f f o r t s  to  m anipu late  m inds. We change th e  way a 
person  looks a t  som ething, as w e ll as what he sees when he lo o k s , by 
changing th e  c o n tin g e n c ie s . Skinner ex p la in s  th a t  we do no t change 
som ething c a l le d  p e rc e p tio n ; we change th e  r e l a t iv e  s tre n g th s  o f 
responses by d i f f e r e n t i a l  re in fo rcem en t o f a l t e r n a t iv e  courses o f 
a c t io n .  We do no t change som ething c a l le d  a p re fe re n c e ; we change 
th e  p r o b a b i l i ty  o f an a c t  by changing a c o n d itio n  o f d e p r iv a tio n  or 
a v e rs iv e  s t im u la t io n . We do no t change a need; we re in fo rc e  beh av io r 
in  p a r t i c u l a r  ways. We do no t g ive  a person  a purpose or an in te n t io n ;  
we change beh av io r tow ard som ething, no t an a t t i t u d e  tow ard i t .  We 
sample and change v e rb a l b eh av io r , no t o p in io n s .
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S k in n e r’s main concept i s  th a t  o f operan t behav io r -  b eh av io r 
which o p e ra tes  upon th e  environm ent t o  produce consequences, which 
can be s tu d ie d  by a rran g in g  environm ents in  which s p e c if ic  consequences 
a re  co n tin g en t upon i t .  The co n tin g en c ie s  under in v e s t ig a t io n  have 
become s te a d i ly  more complex, and th ey  a re  ta k in g  over th e  ex p lan a to ry  
fu n c tio n s  p re v io u s ly  a ss ig n ed  to  p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,  s t a t e s  of mind, 
f e e l in g s ,  t r a i t s  o f c h a ra c te r ,  purposes and in te n t io n s .  On th e  o th e r  
hand, environment can be m an ipu la ted . There i s  no im portan t c au sa l 
connection  between th e  re in fo rcem en t e f f e c t  of a stim ulus and th e  
fe e l in g s  to  which i t  g iv es  r i s e .  A s tim u lu s  i s  no t re in fo rc in g  because 
i t  f e e ls  good, b u t i t  f e e ls  good because i t  i s  r e in fo r c in g .  S tim u li 
a re  re in fo rc in g  and produce c o n d itio n s  which a re  f e l t  as good fo r  a 
s in g le  reaso n , to  be found in  an e v o lu tio n a ry  h is to r y .  Once we have 
id e n t i f i e d  th e  co n tin g en c ie s  th a t  c o n tro l th e  b eh av io r c a l le d  good 
o r bad, r ig h t  o r wrong, th e  d i s t in c t io n  between f a c ts  and how people 
f e e l  about f a c ts  i s  c l e a r .  How people  f e e l  about f a c ts  i s  a b y -p ro d u c t. 
The im portan t th in g  i s  what th e y  do about them, and what th e y  do i s  a 
f a c t  th a t  i s  to  be understood  by examining re le v a n t c o n tin g e n c ie s .
As f a r  as changing beh av io r i s  concerned, Skinner fo llow s h is  
l in e  o f th in k in g  by say ing  th a t  as we come to  u n d erstand  th e  r e la t io n s  
between behav io r and th e  environm ent, we d isco v e r new ways of changing 
b e h a v io r . An assignm ent i s  s ta t e d  as behav io r to  be produced o r 
m odified , and re le v a n t co n tin g en c ie s  a re  th en  a rran g ed . A programmed 
sequence of co n tin g en c ie s  may be needed. There a re  many v a r i e t i e s  of 
"behav ior m o d ifica tio n "  and many d i f f e r e n t  fo rm u la tio n s , b u t th e y  a l l  
ag ree  on th e  e s s e n t ia l  p o in t :  beh av io r can be changed by changing th e
co n d itio n s  o f which i t  i s  a fu n c tio n
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Skinner’s self-knowledge and self-control imply two selves in 
the following sense. The self-knower is almost always a product of 
social contingencies, hut the self that is known may come from other 
sources. The controlling self (the conscience or superego) is of 
social origin, hut the controlled self is more likely to he the 
product of genetic susceptibilities to reinforcement (the id). The 
controlling self represents the interests of the individual.
As to the concepts of awareness and insight, Skinner comments 
that theories of psychotherapy which emphasize awareness assign a 
role to autonomous man which is properly, and much more effectively, 
reserved for contingencies of reinforcement. Awareness may help if 
the problem is in part a lack of awareness, and "insight" into one’s 
condition may help if one then takes remedial action, hut awareness 
or insight alone is not always enough, and it may he too much. One 
need not he aware of one’s behavior or the conditions controlling it 
in order to behave effectively. On the contrary, constant self- 
observation may he a handicap. The extent to which a man should he 
aware of himself depends upon the importance of self-observation for 
effective behavior. Self-knowledge is valuable only to the extent that 
it helps to meet the contingencies under which it has arisen.
Behavioral theory assumes that learning and conditioning are 
instrumental in determining the different kinds of reaction that an 
individual may adopt to environmental stimulation. Modern learning 
theory and the experimental studies of learning, conditioning and 
reinforcement, which we carried out in laboratories, are extremely 
relevant to the problems and procedures of human behavior. Behaviorists
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argue that the whole process of socialization is built upon the 
principles of conditioning. Thus, neurotic reactions, like all 
others, are learned reactions, and must obey the laws of learning 
theory, which enables us to determine the amount of reinforcement 
and conditioning that takes place. According to them, learning 
theory is an exact science, which elaborates quite definite rules 
about the establishment of conditioned reflexes.
In the therapeutic process we deal with maladaptive behavior 
conditioned to certain classes of stimuli. No reference is made to 
any underlying disorders or complexes. And all treatment is concerned 
with habits existing at present, their historical development being 
largely irrelevant.
One of the most prominent advocates of the behavioral theory 
in therapy is Wolpe (84, 85). He, like many others, assumes that 
habits are learned and can only be eliminated effectively through 
unlearning. His approach is based primarily on the drive-reduction 
conditioning model. According to him, human behavior functions in 
accordance with "causal laws". Behavior refers simply to "a change 
of state" or of "spatial relationships" to other objects or events. 
These changes are to be understood as the result of a potentially 
identifiable sequence of antecedent events.
Most of Wolpe’s therapeutical procedures are based on the 
principle of "reciprocal inhibition", and his main technique is 
"desensitization", which is based on reducing the sensitivity to 
the fearful stimuli by presenting it in a state of gradual relaxation.
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Eysenck ( l6 ) ,  w hile argu ing  w ith  th e  p sy c h o a n a ly tic a l approach, 
says th a t  th e  l a t t e r  seems to  suggest t h a t  spontaneous rem ission  
cannot occur, o r when i t  does, i t  can only be of a v e ry  sh o rt- te rm  
d u ra t io n . T his fo llow s th e  p sy c h o a n a ly s ts ’ co n v ic tio n  th a t  n e u ro tic  
b eh av io r i s  m o tiva ted  by some u n d e rly in g  complexes, and th a t  th e  
tre a tm e n t o f th e  symptom w ithou t some form of "uncovering” o f th e  
u n d e rly in g  complexes must le a d  to  a re c u rren ce  o f t h i s  o r o th e r 
symptoms. Eysenck claim s th a t  th e  evidence th a t  th e  f a i lu r e  of 
symptoms to  re c u r  a f t e r  some form of b eh av io r th e rap y  i s  a d e c is iv e  
argument a g a in s t  F reud ian  th e o ry .
Eysenck, in  sp ec ify in g  some c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  o f b e h av io ra l th e ra p y , 
makes i t  obvious th a t  he r e j e c t s  t o t a l l y  F reu d ’s fo rm u la tio n s . They 
a re  as fo llo w s :
1) N euro tic  beh av io r c o n s is ts  o f m aladaptive c o n d itio n a l 
responses o f th e  au tom atic  system , and o f s k e le ta l  responses made to  
reduce th e  co n d itio n ed  (sym pathetic) re a c t io n s ;
2) While th e  term  "symptom" may be r e la te d  to  d e sc rib e  n e u ro tic  
b eh av io r , th e re  i s  no im p lic a tio n  th a t  such behav io r i s  "sym ptomatic" 
fo r  an y th in g .
3) I t  fo llow s th a t  th e re  i s  no u n d e rly in g  complex or o th e r 
"dynamic" cause which i s  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  m aladaptive b eh av io r .
A ll we have to  d ea l w ith  in  n e u ro s is  i s  co n d itio n in g  th e  m aladaptive 
b e h a v io r .
4) Treatm ent c o n s is ts  o f th e  d e co n d itio n in g , by r e c ip ro c a l  
in h ib i t io n ,  e x t in c t io n ,  co n d itio n ed  in h ib i t io n  or in  some o th e r way, 
of th e  m aladap tive b eh av io r -  c o n d itio n in g  a long  th e  l in e s  o f a d ap tiv e
beh av io r
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5) The treatment does not involve any "uncovering" of past 
events•
6) Conditioning and deconditioning will usually proceed 
through hehavioral channels.
Eysenck mentions that there is no reason why verbal methods 
should not also be used. There is good evidence that words are 
conditioned stimuli which have an ascertainable position on the 
stimulus and response generalization.
Thus far an attempt has been made here to discuss some of the 
theoretical assumptions underlying behavioral therapy, as compared 
with traditional theories, and to show their considerable disparity. 
There is no doubt that contemporary psychotherapy has adapted and 
assimilated some elements of the learning principles which govern 
human behavior. Some writers have tried to introduce the relatively 
new formulations into the well-established theories. As far as 
insight is concerned, Holland (32) says that the value of insight 
in altering subsequent adjustment depends upon the presence or 
absence of the conditions necessary for learning, such as adequate 
motivation, suitable reinforcement, and change in the actual responses 
that the patient makes. From this point of view insight is primarily 
useful as a cue to which type of response might lead to more useful 
or gratifying results that have followed upon the patient’s established 
habitual responses. We can, therefore, regard insight as potentially 
useful, but as neither sufficient nor necessary to modifications of 
the patient’s behavior in the psychotherapeutic situation. In such 
a situation it is only necessary that the psychotherapist be adequately
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acquainted, with cause-effect relationships in personality formation 
and reformation. In self-analysis such insight is, of course, a 
necessary but not sufficient condition of behavioral information.
Dollard and Miller (15) try to stay within the psychoanalytic 
frame of reference, yet emphasize the process in terms of some 
principles derived from learning theory. They say that therapy is a 
learning situation, although it is a very special type of learning 
situation, with a very special type of teacher. New learning means 
rearranging the connections between specific events and responses the 
person already has in his repertoire, that is, developing new cue- 
response connections. One of the first tasks of therapy is to break 
old cue-response connections, i.e., extinguishing fear. The fear 
response is terminated not by avoiding the learned elicitor (cue) 
but by removing the fear consequence when the response is performed.
The product of new learning is a new arrangement between events and 
responses - that is, cue-response connections are learned when they 
are effective in reducing drives. It is important that both in 
breaking old habits and in acquiring new ones it is essential that the 
response to be learned or unlearned occurs in close temporal and spatial 
continuity to the other crucial events.
Discussing insight, Dollard and Miller write: "Becoming clearly
aware of the problem and of the unrealistic basis of the fear serves 
as a challenge to try new modes of adjustment. As these new modes of 
adjustment are tried, the fears responsible for inhibition are 
extinguished. When the new responses produce more satisfactory drive 
reduction, they are strongly reinforced . . •
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"In addition to permissiveness, to skill in decoding conflict, 
and to the ability to aid the patient to label and discriminate, the 
therapist has skill in ’dosing1 anxiety. Others have tried to punish 
the symptoms or force the patient to perform the inhibited act.
Both of these methods tend to increase the fear and the conflict.
The therapist concentrates on reducing the fears and other drives 
motivating repression and inhibition, or in other words on analyzing 
’resistance’. He tries to present the patient with a graded series 
of learning situations. He realizes that the patient must set his 
own pace and learn for himself; that it is the patient not the 
therapist who must achieve insight."
Here too the term insight is employed, but the meaning is 
totally different, despite Dollard and Miller’s attempt to stay within 
an orthodox psychoanalytic frame of reference. Insight as they used 
it is an understanding of the changing scene outside, while as others 
wrote about it, it is essentially experiencing with awareness and 
developing knowledge of the inner self.
Karno (33)> trying to describe the role of insight in the 
therapeutic process, as well as the therapist’s tasks in the light 
of learning theory, says that the therapeutic influence customarily 
ascribed to the role of insight in psychotherapy may be more economi­
cally and consistently accounted for within a framework of current 
concepts of communication and operant learning.
The process of psychotherapy, especially what is referred to 
as "insight therapy", when successful, is a process of learning whereby 
the patient’s verbal and other communicative behavior, through subtle
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"but pow erful c o n d itio n in g , comes to  be th a t  which i s  re in fo rc e d  in  
th e  th e ra p e u tic  s i tu a t io n .
What we c a l l  r e a l  o r t r u e  in s ig h t  r e f e r s  in  c l i n i c a l  o p e ra t io n a l  
term s to  an a f t e r - t h e - f a c t  s ta tem en t o f aw areness by th e  p a t i e n t ,  in  
th e  concep tua l language which th e  th e r a p is t  re p e a te d ly  s u p p lie s , 
concern ing  beh av io r which has in  f a c t  been su c c e ss fu lly  e x tin g u ish ed  
and re p la ce d  by more ad ap tiv e  b eh av io r le a rn ed  during  th e  course  of 
th e ra p y . I l l u s t r a t i v e  o f th i s  p o in t i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  as long  as a 
p a t ie n t  p e r s i s t s  in  a n e u ro tic  b eh av io r, h is  in s ig h t  concern ing  th a t  
b eh av io r i s  d e sc rib e d  as  incom plete, or of in s u f f ic ie n t  s t r e n g th .
I t  seems th a t  such a p o in t o f view , de-em phasizing th e  th e ra p e u tic  
in flu en c e  of in s ig h t  p e r  se , i s  even im p lied  to  ho ld  in  la rg e  p a r t  
fo r  th e ra p e u tic  e f f e c t  in  p sy ch o a n a ly s is .
What we c a l l  in s ig h t  i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  th e  concep tua l framework by 
means o f which a th e r a p is t  e s ta b l is h e s ,  o r a ttem p ts  to  e s ta b l i s h ,  a 
lo g ic a l  r e la t io n s h ip  between ev en ts , fe e l in g s  o r ex periences th a t  
seem u n re la te d  in  th e  mind of th e  p a t i e n t .  In  term s of th e  a n a ly s t ’s 
o b je c t iv e s , in s ig h ts  c o n s t i tu te  th e  r a t io n a le  by which th e  p a t ie n t  i s  
persuaded  to  accep t th e  model o f more "mature" o r "hea lthy" beh av io r 
which a n a ly s ts  o f a l l  sch o o ls , im p l ic i t ly  or e x p l i c i t l y ,  h o ld  out to  
him.
What persuades a p a t ie n t  to  accep t th e  model o f more "mature" 
o r "h ea lthy" b e h av io r , a t  l e a s t  in  psycho therapy , i s  only  in  sm all 
p a r t  th e  lo g ic a l  and v e rb a l r a t io n a le  o f in s ig h t .  The la rg e  p a r t  
of such p e rsu as io n  i s  in  th e  person  of th e  th e r a p i s t ,  whose s k i l l f u l  
communication forms an e la b o ra te  system of operan t c o n d itio n in g .
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A therapist becomes expert in communicative skills, which 
become a tool of reinforcement. Through its use the therapist 
becomes in fact a practicing expert in the manipulation and control 
of the behavior of people.
The processes of communication and operant behavioral con­
ditioning, which are major aspects of the child’s social learning 
and maturation, are also major aspects of the therapeutic encounter.
As much as the parent, the therapist selectively reinforces, through 
his communication habits, certain kinds of behavior of the patient.
According to some of the above-mentioned principles deriving 
from learning theory and behavior therapy, one can embark on a re­
examination of Rogers’ technique of "clarification of feelings". The 
therapist chooses and determines which of the client’s reactions is 
worthy of clarification. By doing so, the therapist reinforces 
certain reactions, and reduces the occurrence of the others.
Moreover, Truax (79) indicates that the nondirective therapist 
is consciously or unconsciously using empathy, acceptance, and directive­
ness as reinforcers. The basic property of a reinforcer is that its 
use with specific classes of behavior leads to consequent change in 
the probability of occurrence of these classes of behavior. The 
present findings point to the presence of significant differential 
reinforcement effects imbedded in the transactions of client-centered 
psychotherapy. Since differential reinforcement is one of the 
procedures used in operant research to alter (or control) behavior, 
the findings suggest that the therapist, in the case of Rogers, 
implicitly alters (or controls) the patient’s behavior in the
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th e ra p e u tic  s e t t i n g .  To t h i s  e x te n t th e  evidence weighs in  fav o r of 
th e  view proposed by Skinner r a th e r  th an  th a t  of R ogers. The p re se n t 
f in d in g s  a re  no t c o n s is te n t w ith  R ogers' view th a t  r e l a t i v e ly  uniform  
c o n d itio n s  which a re  g lo b a lly  " f a c i l i t a t i v e  o f p e rso n a l growth and 
in te g ra t io n "  a re  o ffe re d  to  p a t ie n ts  in  a manner no t co n tin g en t upon 
th e  p a t i e n t 's  b eh av io r . The f in d in g  th a t  empathy and warmth a c t  as 
r e in fo r c e r s  su g gests  th a t  th e  evidence r e l a t in g  empathy and warmth 
to  p a t ie n t  outcome i s  open to  a b e h a v io r is t ic  in te r p r e ta t io n ,  based  
in  p a r t  on th e  t h e r a p i s t 's  use of d i f f e r e n t  re in fo rce m e n ts .
Wentworth (82) analyzes and c r i t i c i z e s  some p r in c ip le s  of 
b eh av io r th e ra p y , e s p e c ia l ly  reg a rd in g  in s ig h t .  According to  him, 
th e  l i t e r a t u r e  o f beh av io r th e rap y  re p o r ts  s ig n i f ic a n t  success in  th e  
re d u c tio n  of psychopathology w ithou t th e  a p p lic a t io n  of in s ig h t  th e ra p y . 
The sea rch  fo r  in tra p sy c h ic  causes (h ie s ,  p h o b ias, e t c . )  i s  a w aste o f 
tim e , s in ce  such symptomatology i s  based  on le a rn in g  o r h a b it  fo rm atio n , 
and does n o t a r i s e  from in te r n a l  causes o r c o n f l i c t s .  The b eh av io r 
th e r a p is t  d isco u n ts  th e  fu n c tio n  of o th e r  psychodynamic is su e s  such as 
t ra n s fe re n c e  m o tiv a tio n , d e sp ite  th e  b e h a v io r i s t*s c lo se  a t te n t io n  to  
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e r a p is t  and c l i e n t .  But m o tiv a tio n , b o th  
a f f e c tu a l  and id e a t io n a l ,  and th e  d e s ire  fo r  c lo se  ra p p o rt would seem 
to  be lo c a te d  in te r n a l ly ,  however th ey  m ight have o r ig in a te d .
B ehavior th e o ry  has e n te re d  th e  f i e l d  o f c l i n i c a l  p r a c t ic e  th rough  
th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f v a rio u s  laws o f le a rn in g  drawn from le a rn in g  
th e o r ie s .  D if fe re n t  taxonom ies o f tre a tm e n t tech n iq u es  a re  th en  
conceived as a p p ro p r ia te  c l i n i c a l  m ethods. Wolpe and Lazarus use 
c o u n te r-c o n d itio n in g , p o s i t iv e  re -c o n d itio n in g  and experim en tal
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extinction. The aim of these techniques is "to change habits judged 
undesirable". A habit is a conditioned stimulus-response bond, a 
unit of learned behavior. Analytic resistance to the use of behavior 
techniques is perhaps ascribable to two commonly over-simplified 
views of human behavior, as outlined by the stimulus-response model 
of personality. A major deficiency in the clinical reports of 
behavior therapy is the lack of raw data, or verbatim accounts of 
clinical events that occur before, during and after the application 
of behavior techniques. The behavior therapist is frequently unable 
to rule in or to rule out various factors (history taking, discussion 
of problems, positive transference, rapport, etc.) that might have 
been causes of any change in psychotherapy.
Self-awareness leading to insight is an ego characteristic. 
Anxiety is a keystone in the nature of self-awareness and insight. 
Minimal anxiety accelerates thought processes and learning; too much 
anxiety blocks such ego functioning and insight; and severe anxiety 
disorganizes and immobilizes thought, so that insight is significantly 
disabled. Wolpe and Lazarus (85) also report that the construction 
and administration of hierarchies often reveal to the patients that 
their presented problems are not the real sources of their anxieties. 
Learning theory explains this transformation in symptom development 
as stimulus or response generalization. He goes on: the general
impression is that if the symptoms are of relatively recent origin 
and are stimulus-bound to external sources that are easily defined, 
reduction of anxiety and symptoms is relatively quick and the 
development of insight and the release of other affects is enhanced.
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Conversely, if the symptoms are more direct expressions of early, 
historical experiences and laden with other affects of aggression 
and sexuality, the symptoms and anxiety are not reduced easily, if 
at all, by behavior techniques. As far as insight is concerned,
Wentworth argues that in behavior therapy insight sometimes "sneaks 
in", although orthodox therapists would not admit it openly. The 
discounting of the concept of insight in behavior therapy is weakened 
by its own reports. On the other hand, insight is denigrated yet its 
occurrence is often self-evident. Perhaps the explanation as to why 
insight is not noticeable to behavior therapists is that through 
their frank disapproval of free verbalization they may increase 
suppression, or in behavior terms, accomplish aversive conditioning.
By the same token, through extensive interviewing during the investiga­
tion of history and contexts of symptoms and anxiety, with the safety 
of good "rapport" and in view of the fact that persons often continue 
introspective processes once started, the behavior therapist may well 
include insight and ego integration without recognizing their occurrence.
Despite justified criticism, one must not discount the contribu­
tion of behavior therapy. Its theorists have certainly made an attempt 
to grapple with the problem of the "how" and "why" in psychotherapy, 
although they have totally ignored the problem of the "what"• Moreover, 
they have offered several principles which govern the acquisition of 
behavior, but these basic principles are relevant or can be applied 
in explaining only part of the whole spectrum of human behavior.
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CHAPTER VI
CREATIVITY: AN ANALOGOUS PROCESS
Several writers have contended that reorganization, or re­
integration, is one of the characteristics of insight; "but it seems 
to me that not enough attention has been given to this aspect. In 
all humbleness I wish to argue - and hope to show - that his facet 
is one of the most prominent characteristics of the concept. Insight 
is basically founded on a given knowledge (the acquisition of which 
can be explained in accordance with principles derived from learning 
theory.) Its uniqueness has to do with a new organization of well- 
known facts or bits of knowledge, or perhaps a new combination 
between them. This new combination represents or creates a new 
entity; it is more than the sum of its components. This notion of 
insight, or being a process of combination that creates some new 
entity, is in some aspects similar to the process of creativity. It 
would therefore be relevant if we were to analyze - from this point 
of view - the process of creativity. Later on we shall try to show 
that both processes share some of their characteristics. The analogy 
between the two may help us in clarifying the concept of insight in 
p sychotherapy•
As to the relevance of creativity to insight, Hutchinson (in 72) 
remarks that any genuine insight, intellectual or experiential, 
represents a creative act in the sense that it changes more or less 
significantly what is. Insights, he maintains, expand not only an
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area of knowledge but also expand him who has developed them. In 
his straining to gain meaningful knowledge, whether about himself 
or material outside himself, in the very process of straining and 
achieving new perceptions the perceiver inevitably becomes something 
new himself. Hutchinson says: "It is hardly necessary at such a
place in our discussion to recall that intellectual discovery, though 
depending upon certain casual factors at this point in its history, 
is in no sense an accident in its fundamental mechanism. It must 
have background and substructure from which to start, the result of 
continuous storing of the mind and growing polarization of interest. 
Focal points of interest must have been established by hard, deliberate 
labor in technical preparation, abetted by an inveterate habit of 
ranging far afield in intervals of less serious effort . • • Erudition 
is not enough; unrelieved industry is not enough; accuracy in the use 
and presentation of data is not enough; care in the use of inference 
and all the tools of art and science are not enough. There must be 
more; and that more has to do with the spontaneous reorganization of 
these acquired elements under the aegis of an event which is in reality 
not a mere addendum to, but rather an interpenetration of the levels 
of mental experience. And as a result one not only creates something; 
he becomes something as well."
Not only is creativity relevant to insight, one can find 
similarities between these and other processes as well. According to 
the author of the item on Problem Solving in the International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (71), frequent references to 
"the problem-solving process," "the decision-making process," and
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"the creative process" may suggest that problem solving can be clearly 
distinguished from decision making or creative thinking from either, 
in terms of the processes involved. These phrases can also imply 
that each involves a single process. On the basis of present evidence, 
however, it appears that each involves a variety of processes. More­
over, it appears that processes important in problem solving are also 
often important in decision making or in creative thinking. Each of 
these activities may therefore best be defined not in terms of 
process but in terms of product. For example, creativity is that 
thinking which results in the production of ideas (or other products) 
that are both novel and worthwhile. Similarly, decision making is 
that thinking which results in the choice among alternative courses 
of action; problem solving is that thinking which results in the 
solution of problems. Thus problem solving, decision making, and 
creativity are all to be regarded as kinds of thinking. The question 
of the degree to which these and other kinds of thinking - for example, 
concept attainment - involve the same or different processes is a 
question that remains to be answered by empirical investigation.
The true value of creativity is to be found in daily living, 
not in the creation of the usual cultural sphere. Moreno (in 10) 
points out that creativity is the central core of human behavior as it 
is lived day to day. "People of small talent may need longer warming 
up periods to be creative than the aristocrats of the mind." To be 
creative means more than to be adaptable: "The creativity factor
leads humanity to respond constructively to new situations rather than 
merely to adapt to new situations."
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Moreno emphasizes the therapeutic technique of spontaneous 
creativity (the neurotic and psychotic may fail to make adjustments 
because of their non-creative stereotyped behavior). If one accepts 
the assumptions that the more creative the personality, the more 
problems it can solve, and that the more creative it is the better 
it can structure and predict the future, then it seems mandatory to 
Moreno that we must train for creativity.
"Creativity is a separate entity from spontaneity and a separate 
entity from cultural conserve but strategically linked to both."
Moreno considers spontaneity as the chief catalyzer of creativity.
Here he means that the ideas are brought together by spontaneous 
action, and if one is lucky and/or persistently spontaneous about 
his output, a creative act may occur. If the spontaneous output is 
genuine and persistent, there usually occurs a creative act. Moreno 
suggests that creativity can be defined better operationally and 
pragmatically by its results than by the purely semantic approach.
He feels that the results may be new to the individual, but not 
necessarily to the rest of the world. The crux of creativity is not 
that one discovers anything that man has never known before, or that 
has never to man's knowledge ever existed before, but that in most 
cases a new relationship has been created which did not exist before.
Moreno distinguishes between three forms of creativity:
1) Chance - the type of creative act that happens by pure luck 
and can rarely be duplicated;
2) Spontaneous creativity - bringing something new into being 
from a feeling of spontaneity which is designed to meet an immediate
purpose;
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3 ) Conservable c r e a t iv ity  - where the th in g  created does not 
n e c e ssa r ily  meet an immediate purpose (p a in tin g , p o e try ). There i s  
very l i t t l e ,  i f  any, feedback in  conservable c r e a t iv ity . I t  i s  always 
there in  the second form.
K oestler (36) provides us w ith a very v iv id  d escr ip tion  o f the 
process o f creation  and d iscovery . According to  him, i t  had been 
sa id  th a t d iscovery  c o n s is ts  in  see in g  an analogy which nobody has 
seen b e fo r e . The act o f d iscovery has a d isru p tive  and con stru ctive  
a sp e c t . I t  must d isrupt r ig id  patterns of mental organization  to  
achieve the new sy n th e s is . Discovery o ften  means simply the uncovering 
of something which has always been there but was hidden from the edge 
by the b lin k ers  o f h a b it . This equally  a p p lies  to  the d isco v er ie s  of 
the a r t i s t  who makes us see fa m iliar  ob jects and events in  a strange, 
new revea lin g  l ig h t  -  as i f  p ierc in g  the cataract which dims our 
v is io n . The s t a t i s t i c a l  p ro b a b ility  for  a relevan t d iscovery to  be 
made i s  the grea ter , the more e sta b lish ed  and w e ll exerc ised  each of 
the s t i l l  separate s k i l l s  or thought-m atrices a re . The more r ip e  a 
s itu a t io n  i s  fo r  the d iscovery of a new sy n th es is , the le s s  need 
there i s  for  the help ing hand o f chance. One should not underestim ate 
rip en ess as a fa c to r  f a c i l i t a t in g  d isc o v e r ie s . The various components 
which w i l l  go in to  the new sy n th esis  are a l l  ly in g  around and only  
w aitin g  for  the tr ig g e r , a c tio n  of chance, or the ca ta lyz in g  of 
a ction  o f excep tion a l brain  to  be assembled and welded to g eth er .
The core o f the problem of d iscovery , both in  scien ce  and in  a r t ,  
has two e n t ir e ly  d if fe r e n t k in d s. The f i r s t  due to  consciou s, lo g ic a l  
reasoning aided by chance; the second a c la s s ic a l  case of the in te r ­
ven tion  o f the unconscious
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Concerning the psychology of the creative act itself, Koestler 
points out that there are interrelated aspects of it. The displacement 
of attention to something not previously noted, which was irrelevant 
in the old and is relevant in the new context; the discovery of hidden 
analogies as a result of the former; the bringing into conscious of 
tacit axioms and habits of thought which were implied in the code and 
taken for granted; the uncovering of what has always been there.
This leads to the paradox that the more original the discovery, the 
more obvious it seems afterwards. The creative act does not consist 
of creating something out of nothing: it uncovers, selects, re­
shuffles, combines, synthesizes already existing facts, ideas, 
faculties, skills. The more familiar the parts, the more striking 
the new whole. When the situation is ripe for a given type of 
discovery it still needs the intuitive power of an exceptional mind, 
and sometimes a favorable chance event, to bring it from potential 
into actual existence.
Thus, at one end of the scale we have discoveries which seem 
to be due to more or less conscious, logical Reasoning, and at the 
other end sudden insights which seem to emerge spontaneously from the 
depth of the unconscious. There is evidence for large chunks of 
irrationality embedded in the creative process, not only in art, but 
in the exact sciences as well. Here, then, is the apparent paradox.
A branch of knowledge which operates predominantly with abstract 
symbols, whose entire rationale and credo are objectivity, verifiability, 
logicality, turns out to be dependent on mental processes which are 
subjective, irrational, and verifiable only after the event.
As to how the new synthesis comes into being, Koestler says 
that the evidence indicates that verbal thinking, and conscious 
thinking in general, play only a subordinate part in the decisive 
phase of the creative act. Awareness is a matter of degree, and 
only a fraction of our multi-levelled activities at any moment 
enters the beam of focal consciousness. The moment of truth, the 
sudden emergence of new insight, is an act of intuition. Such 
intuitions give the appearance of miraculous flashes or short-circuits 
of reasoning. In fact they may be linked to an immersed chain, of 
which only the beginning and the end are visible above the surface 
of consciousness. Koestler goes on to say that the new integration 
arises by various processes which can be arranged in series. It 
ranges from faulty or premature integration through partial blindness 
towards the meaning or significance of one*s own discoveries, to the 
gradual blending of matrices by dint of repetitive experiences which 
increase the number of links between them. There is the sudden 
illumination of "spontaneous” discoveries, sparked off by an unconscious 
intuition, or a chance observation, or a combination of both.
Ghiselin (24) stresses the similarities between creativity in 
art and discovery in science. Both in art and in pure science, the 
end is not novelty, but use. Neither in art nor in science is the 
use always anticipated. Application of a scientific truth to narrowly 
practical purposes may never occur, and it often follows long after 
the discovery. But it is evident that in both art and science the 
inventor is to some degree incited and guided by the sense of value 
of usefulness. The creative worker is dependent on affective guides 
rather than on any explicit intellectual process.
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Benda (8) f in d s  some d if fe re n c e s  Between c r e a t iv i ty  and d isco v e ry . 
T h in k in g -o rien ted  persons a re  p r im a r i ly  in te r e s te d  in  th e  lo g ic a l  
p ro cess  aimed a t  an im personal fac t-w e ig h in g  and a n a ly s is .  The fe e l in g -  
judgment i s  concerned w ith  e v a lu a tio n  o f th in g s .  I t  i s  obvious th a t  
re se a rc h  s c i e n t i s t s  fav o r th ink ing-judgm ent w hile  in tu i t i v e  a r t i s t i c a l l y -  
minded persons fav o r th e  f e e l in g  and th e  concern w ith  meaning and v a lu e . 
C rea tiv e  persons a re  more concerned w ith  a l l  a sp e c ts  o f in n e r exp erien ces  
o r th e  r e l a t iv e  absence o f re p re s s io n  and c o n tro l o f im pulses and im ages. 
"R epression  o p e ra tes  a g a in s t  c r e a t iv i t y ,  because i t  makes u n a v a ilab le  
to  th e  in d iv id u a l la rg e  a sp e c ts  of h is  own ex p e rien ce ."
Many w r i te r s  t r y  to  show th e  common elem ents in  s c i e n t i f i c  
d isco v ery  and c r e a t iv i ty ,  w ith o u t -  however - s t r e s s in g  th e  d if fe re n c e s  
between th e  two. F i r s t ,  l e t  us examine th e  concept o f d isco v e ry .
Bruner ( l l )  i s  in te r e s te d  in  th e  e f f e c t s  of th e  a c t  o f d isco v e ry , 
b e fo re  he d e fin e s  o r ex p la in s  th e  concept i t s e l f .  D iscovery i s  a 
m a tte r  o f re a rra n g in g  or tran sfo rm in g  evidence done in  such a way 
th a t  one i s  ab le  to  go beyond th e  evidence so reassem bled to  new 
in s ig h t .  Bruner su g g ests  th a t  a "w ell p rep a red  mind" i s  needed; 
l a t e r ,  i t  w i l l  appear as an expectancy fo r  f in d in g  r e g u la r i t i e s  and 
re la t io n s h ip s  in  th e  environm ent. B runer d is t in g u is h e s  between 
d isco v ery  as a p roduct and as a p ro c e ss . The q u es tio n  i s  w hether we 
co n sid er d iscovery  by i t s  outcome o r by i t s  e a r ly  e x e rc is e s  in  th e  
form of in q u iry . Kuhn (4o) claim s th a t  d isco v ery  i s  a p ro cess  th a t  
l in k s  o b serv a tio n  and c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n  ( f a c ts  and a s s im ila t io n  in to  
th eo ry ) and th e re fo re  cannot be a t t r ib u te d  to  a c e r ta in  moment. There 
a re  no t s tag es  in  th e  sequence b u t "a complex ev en t, invo lves reco g n iz in g  
bo th  th a t  something i s  and what i t  i s . "
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P o lany i ( 57) d is t in g u is h e s  th re e  s tag e s  in  th e  p ro cess  of 
d isco v e ry : p re p a ra t io n , i l lu m in a tio n , and v e r i f i c a t i o n .  "The
unknown i s  th e r e ,  e s s e n t i a l ly  determ ined by what i s  known about i t . "
I t  seems th a t  P o lan y i assumes th e  e x is te n c e  of th e  s o lu tio n  b e fo re  
even in v en tin g  i t .
We have brough t th e  l a s t  q u o ta tio n s  in  an a ttem p t to  d e sc rib e  
th e  concept o f d isco v e ry . Now l e t  us p o in t out th e  d if fe re n c e  betw een 
d isco v ery  and c r e a t i v i t y .  When one t r i e s  to  d isco v e r som ething, th e  
assum ption i s  th a t  th e re  i s  som ething to  be d isco v e red . Somewhere 
th e re  e x i s t s  an o b je c t ,  f a c t ,  phenomenon; and th e  problem i s  to  reach  
i t .  The g o a l to  be reached  e x is t s  in  i t s e l f ,  independen tly  o f th e  
a c t i v i t y  o f th e  in v e s t ig a to r ,  and th e  il lu m in a tio n  of th e  d isco v ery  
i s  th e  encoun ter between them . Even i f  one does not reach  a s p e c if ic  
g o a l, n e v e r th e le s s  th e  goa l s t i l l  e x i s t s ,  and someone e ls e  may reach  
i t .  The case  of c r e a t iv i t y  i s  q u ite  d i f f e r e n t .  C re a t iv i ty  i s  a 
unique in te r a c t io n  between th e  c re a to r  and th e  m a te r ia l  he works w ith . 
There a re  n e i th e r  f i n a l  r e s u l t s  th a t  can be reached  by anybody, nor 
any k ind  o f o b je c t iv e  e x is te n c e . I t  sometimes happens th a t  even th e  
c re a to r  h im se lf  i s  no t always su re  about h is  g o a l. The d isco v e re r 
has a moment o f i l lu m in a tio n  w hile  reach in g  th e  f i n a l  r e s u l t ;  th e  
c re a to r ,  though ex p erien c in g  i l lu m in a tio n , s t i l l  has to  e la b o ra te  h is  
f i n a l  r e s u l t s  in  a p ro longed  p ro c e ss . The d isc o v e re r  has to  v e r i f y  
and j u s t i f y  h is  d isco v e ry  in  o rd e r to  make i t  p a r t  o f accum ulated 
knowledge. This i s  n o t th e  case w ith  c r e a t iv i ty ,  where th e re  is  
no th ing  to  be j u s t i f i e d  o b je c t iv e ly  in  term s o f t ru e  o r f a l s e .  In  
th e  l i g h t  o f t h i s  d isc u ss io n  i t  seems c le a r  th a t  in s ig h t  i s  analogous 
to  th e  p ro cess  o f c r e a t iv i t y  r a th e r  th an  to  th e  p ro cess  of d isco v e ry .
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Let us now turn to the artist himself in order to find out 
about his own resources, his personality structure and his relation­
ships with reality.
From its early days, the psychoanalytic theory made an effort 
to encompass the problem of the creative artist and the origin of 
artistic productivity. Freud (19) shows interest and knowledge in 
arts. Some of his classical research has to do with the work of 
da Vinci, Michaelangelo and Dostoyevsky. The creative artist is 
regarded, in Freud’s writings, as a person who is gifted and capable 
of distinguishing mental and emotional processes which are unknown 
to the layman. Freud claims that a work of art is a disguised 
expression of the sexual instinct, and an indirect way to fulfill 
the needs derived from this energy. This indirect expression is 
supported by the process of sublimation. The latter defense mechanism 
is helped by the ego to turn the instinctual drives to social sub­
stitutions •
From Freud’s point of view, art is like a dream or a daydream.
It is an imaginary way of fulfilling in reality hidden, unexpressed 
and forbidden wishes in a legitimate way accepted by society. Freud 
was impressed by the artist’s capability to express almost openly 
these forbidden and imaginary wishes that are usually floating in the 
realm of the unconscious and can be reached or uncovered only through 
the long process of psychoanalysis. Freud says that the constitution 
of the artist's personality exemplifies itself, on one hand, by the 
strongness of its sublimation, and by a certain flexibility of the 
repression mechanism on the other. The artist is an introvert, living
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under the stress of extremely strong instincts, facing the difficulty 
of satisfying these strong instincts or drives. By his artistic 
talent he is able to transform his images into works of art rather 
than symptoms and by doing so he is able to escape from his neurosis 
and return - though indirectly - and remain in touch with reality.
The artist's secret talent is embodied in his special capability to 
translate his daydreams in a way which is accepted by others.
Freud describes the process of artistic creation, discusses the 
mechanisms that take part in this process and the needs that are ful­
filled by it; but he was unable to satisfactorily explain the mere 
existence of the process. The artistic talent remains a mystery.
As opposed to Freud's interpretation of the artistic endeavor, 
Hatterer (28) claims that present day theories have begun to stress 
ego functions, the flexibility of an artist's mind to shift between 
different levels of consciousness, and his ability to synthesize the 
raw material from these levels of consciousness into a creative product 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the creative process cannot 
be interpreted simply either by rephrasing theories of the artist's 
resolution of early parental and sexual traumas, identity problems, 
castration and unsolved oedipal complexes, or as an attempt by the 
artist to rid himself of anxiety, rage or guilt or balance his 
alternate depressions. A normal psychological reason for persisting 
in artistic endeavor is that it is emotionally a most satisfactory 
way of getting along with people - it is the way to survive, integrate 
into society. It is unlikely that any original scientific contribution 
no matter how cerebral in nature, has occurred without an emotional
determinant
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Ghiselin (24) describes the conscious and unconscious factor in 
the creative process, saying that the unconscious developments and 
the spontaneous activities that go forward without foresight, yet in 
full consciousness, are induced and focused by an intense conscious 
effort spent upon the material to be developed, or in the area to be 
illuminated. Such tension gives stimulation and direction to the 
unconscious activity which goes on after the tension is released.
The desired developments are usually delayed for some time during 
which presumably something like incubation is going on. Then, with­
out warning, the solution or the germinal insight may appear. The 
inspiration is sometimes given wholly at one stroke.
Benda (8) presents the existentialist point of view by pointing 
out the communicative aspect of creativity and the creator, the 
encounter between the artist and his material, and the encounter 
between the artist and society. The creative person is able to 
translate his individual world into symbolic forms which can be 
shared and understood by others. It is the confrontation with the 
otherness through which the reality of the individual's own inner 
world is tested in its meaningfulness for others. He goes on 
explaining that creativity is the human ability (l) to see and grasp 
higher complexities, (2) to see relationships beyond the established 
and accepted framework of connections, (3) to discover meanings not 
yet recognized, (4) to command the tools of communication in order 
to convey insight to others through symbolic messaging in understandable 
forms. There are, of course, many forms of human creativity, and 
creative persons use various means of symbolic representation for
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communication. Previous studies seem to indicate, however, that there 
is a common denominator in all forms of creativity and this rests on 
a different reality-attitude which is common to all creative people.
Imagery as the totality of images of the world is 'concrete,* 
experiential, and not fragmented into objective matter. The images 
are always experienced and seen in a specific context which is 
structured in its relationships according to the meaning and value 
of each data within the complexity of experience. This 'subjectivity* 
of the imagery world - in contrast to the 'objectivity* of things - 
is therefore structured according to the emotional and sociocultural 
validity of experience.
Imagery reflects the reality in structural patterns according 
to meanings and values which are not conscious to the average person.
In intuition, the person becomes aware of a new meaningfulness of 
experience and subjectivity of imagery patterns. The creative person 
commands tools of communication and is able to convey insight to 
others. In contrast to the dreamer, fantast and reality-estranged 
person, the creative person has what is sometimes called 'reality 
adaptation.* Creativity requires a constant reorganization which 
cannot be achieved without constant fluctuation or mobility between 
progressive integration and regressive starting anew. Thus, 
creativity is a bi-phasic process. The creative artist has to command 
a flexibility which enables him to differentiate fixed configurations 
and reorganize the elements in non-existing new patterns of imagery.
And the creative person needs a greater ability to integrate those 
processes which we identify with maturity, as well as the more primitive 
personality patterns that enable him to regress and identify with objects 
on a rather primitive level.
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It was Guilford (26) who in 1950, in his presidential address 
to the American Psychological Association, called for the investing 
of additional efforts in the research of creativity. In that lecture 
he not only expressed the need for such research, but even gave a 
kind of design and method for that kind of work. He claimed that 
creativity represents patterns of primary abilities, in which 
individuals differ in a continuous manner. He thought that it will 
be fruitful to define it on an operatical base, and that a factor- 
analysis will reveal the real factors which constitute the whole 
domain which is usually called 'creativity.' He even suggested 
some hypotheses concerning creative abilities.
According to him, the creative personality possesses those 
patterns or trails that are characteristic of creative persons. A 
creative pattern is manifest in creative behavior which includes 
such activities as inventing, designing, contriving, composing and 
planning. Creativity and creative productivity extend well beyond 
the domain of intelligence. It is proper to say that a creative act 
is an instance of learning, for it represents a change in behavior 
that is due to stimulation and/or response. A comprehensive learning 
theory must take into account both insight and creative activity. 
Insight and creative behavior show much apparent relationship. The 
general psychological conviction seems to be that all individuals 
possess to same degree all abilities, except for the occurrence of 
pathologies. Creative acts can therefore be expected, no matter how 
feeble or how inadequate, of almost all individuals. The important 
consideration is the concept of continuity whatever the nature of
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creative talent may be, these persons who are recognized as creative 
merely have more of what all of us have. There is much evidence of 
substantial positive correlations between I.Q. as measured by the 
intelligence test and certain creative talents, but the extent of 
the correlation is unknown. Our main objective is to teach students 
how to think, and this means also to think constructively. If we 
succeed in this objective, there should be much evidence of 
creativeness in the end product.
Guilford suggests that a general theory could be drawn, and 
should be tested - saying that some primary abilities can be improved 
with practice of various kinds, and that positive transference will 
be evident in tasks depending upon those abilities.
According to Guilford and others, the creative act involves four
steps:
1) Preparation - devoted to an inspection of the problem and 
collection of information or material.
2) Incubation - there seems to be little progress in the 
direction of fulfillment, but the unconscious ability is taking place.
3) Inspiration - final or semi-final solution often accompanied 
by strong emotion.
4) Evaluation or verification - putting to test the solution or 
examination of the product for its fitness or value. Such analysis 
does not tell us almost anything about the mental operations that 
actually occur.
Guilford goes on to explain that within the factoral frame of 
reference of creativity there is much room for different types of 
abilities. They may have some factors in common, but there is much 
room for variation of pattern and abilities.
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Guilford finds some possible thinking factors that are more 
obviously creative in character: (l) There are individual differences
in a variable that may be called sensitivity to problems; (2) There is 
a fluency factor, or there are a number of fluency factors in creative 
talent; (3) Novel ideas - the degree of novelty of which the person 
is capable, or which he habitually exhibits is pertinent; (4) The 
individual’s flexibility of mind plays a significant role in the 
process of creativity; (5) Synthesizing ability - much creative 
thinking requires the organization of ideas into larger, more 
inclusive patterns; (6) Analyzing ability - symbolic structures must 
often be broken down before new ones can be built; (7) Factor involving 
the reorganizing or redefinition of organized wholes. Creative pro­
ductivity in everyday life is undoubtedly dependent upon primary traits 
other than abilities. Motivational factors (interest and attitudes) 
as well as temperament factors must be significant contributors.
It will be of interest to mention here that Guilford, who 
encouraged a whole generation of researchers to start working in the 
foregoing direction, ended in 1967 with a complete model for human 
intelligence, although with some reservations as to the nature of 
creativity. Although some of his DP (divergent-production) factors 
seem to be of creative nature, he mentions several times that the 
creative potential is more complicated, and it is possible that 
factors other than intelligence contribute to it.
"But there is a distinct possibility that almost any other, in 
neither the DP nor the transformation categories, may make important 
contribution to the creative act, whatever it may be. The term
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c re a t iv e  p o te n t ia l ,  l i k e  th e  term  in te l l ig e n c e ,  needs q u a l i f ic a t io n  
w herever i t  i s  used  i f  communication i s  to  he a t  a l l  p r e c is e ."
I t  seems, th e re fo re ,  th a t  even in  1967 he s t i l l  d id  no t have 
enough evidence to  enab le  him to  fo rm ulate  a complete th e o ry  o f 
c r e a t iv i t y .  We have a lre a d y  m entioned G u ilfo rd 's  1950 le c tu r e  which 
opened new h o riz o n s . Perhaps i t  would be in  p lace  to  r e f e r  to  some 
re se a rc h  p ro je c ts  undertaken  s in c e . F i r s t ,  i t  was n ecessa ry  to  
e s ta b l i s h  an independent dim ension c a l le d  c r e a t iv i ty ,  which w i l l  be 
d i s t i n c t  from th e  g e n e ra l in te l l ig e n c e  measured by th e  I .Q . t e s t s .
G e tze l and Jackson (23) worked on a la rg e  sample o f s tu d e n ts , in c lu d in g  
case s tu d ie s ,  dem onstrating  th a t  in te l l ig e n c e  and c r e a t iv i ty  a re  
d i f f e r e n t  d im ensions. In  o rd er to  t e s t  t h i s ,  G etze l and Jackson 
produced f iv e  t e s t s  fo r  c r e a t iv i t y  (Word A sso c ia tio n  T e s t, Uses fo r  
Thing, Hidden Shapes, F a b le s , and Make-up P roblem s).
W allach and Kogan (8 l)  c r i t i c i z e d  th e  way G etze l and Jackson 
a tta c k e d  th e  problem . They s a id  th a t  in  o rd er to  prove th e  independence 
of th e  domain of c r e a t iv i t y ,  th e  m easures w ith in  th a t  domain should  be 
c lo s e r ,  and w ith  h ig h e r c o r r e la t io n ,  than  w ith  o th e r  measures from th e  
domain o f g e n e ra l in te l l ig e n c e .  They to o  claim ed th a t  th e re  was a 
d i s t i n c t  domain o f c r e a t iv i ty  b u t i t  should be measured by new ta s k s  
th an  th o se  suggested  b e fo re . They e s ta b lis h e d  a s e t  o f r e l i a b le  
ta sk s  fo r  s c o r in g : (a ) f lu e n c y , and (B) o r ig i n a l i t y .  They found
th a t  a perm issive  atm osphere i s  one o f th e  b a s ic  c o n d itio n s  to  promote 
th e  c r e a t iv i t y  measured by them measured by th e se  two ta s k s .
Some o th e r d i r e c t io n  of re s e a rc h  was e s ta b lis h e d  by Torrance (78) 
and th e  M innesota group which worked on c r e a t iv i ty  t e s t s .  T rying to  
f in d  th e  development of c r e a t iv i ty  th rough age, Torrance developed a
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b a t te r y  of c re a t iv e  ta s k s ,  in  which many a re  n o n -v e rb a l. He adopted 
some o f G u ilfo rd ’s ta s k s ,  b u t t r i e d  an o th er approach . He was no t 
look ing  fo r  a whole th e o ry  fo r  th e  c re a t iv e  dim ension, b u t t r i e d  to  
d isco v e r i t s  n a tu re  by i t s  m a n ife s ta tio n  on v a rio u s  ta s k s .  In s te a d  
o f u s in g  f a c to r - a n a ly s is ,  he b u i l t  a b a t te r y  of ta s k s ,  se rv in g  to  
measure c re a t iv e  b e h a v io r .
While many re s e a rc h e rs  t r i e d  to  f in d  a r e la t io n  between 
c r e a t iv i ty  and o th e r  p e r s o n a l i ty  t r a i t s ,  Torrance used th e  o p e ra tio n a l 
d e f in i t io n  o f c r e a t i v i t y  (as d e fin ed  by h is  ta s k s )  and t r i e d  to  f o s te r  
i t  in  th e  c lassroom . Much o f h is  e f f o r t  was d ire c te d  tow ards th e  
e d u ca tio n a l a s p e c t ,  and th e  te a c h e r ’s ro le  in  rew arding c re a t iv e  t a l e n t .  
He a ls o  t r i e d  to  change te a c h e rs ' a t t i tu d e s  and m ethods.
The above a t t i t u d e  and approach suggest th a t  i t  i s  w orthw hile 
and f r u i t f u l  to  f o s te r  c r e a t iv i ty  even b e fo re  com pleting an a l l -  
rounded th e o ry  o f i t .
In  summary, a lth o u g h  c r e a t iv i t y  i s  u su a lly  ep itom ized  in  a r t ,  
as d isco v ery  i s  ep itom ized  in  sc ie n c e , i t  would be im portan t to  
co n cep tu a liz e  i t  in  a b ro ad e r manner. C rea tiv e  a c ts  can be found in  
everyday l i f e  and a c t io n s .  Moreover, in d iv id u a l d if fe re n c e s  have been 
found as f a r  as t h i s  a b i l i t y  i s  concerned, and i t  has been shown th a t  
t r a in in g  can be used  in  o rd e r to  c o n c re tiz e  i t .
The p ro cess  o f c r e a t iv i t y ,  l ik e  th e  p ro cess  of in s ig h t ,  c o n s is ts  
m ainly of th e  c re a t io n  of new com binations. In  o rder to  be a b le  to  
v is u a l iz e  (even in  a sym bolic manner) and th en  u t i l i z e  th e se  new 
com binations, one has to  reach  a c e r ta in  s t a t e  o f f l e x i b i l i t y .  Both
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processes are similar in some of the stages and sequence that are 
necessary for the achieving of either insight or the creative act. 
These are preparation, incubation, illumination and evaluation.
And it seems that in order to promote both creativity and insight, 
a special atmosphere is needed.
Much scientific research has been done in the field of 
creativity, but the phenomenon is not yet clear. It is hoped that 
additional knowledge and understanding of the process of insight 




F i r s t ,  l e t  us c o l la te  th o se  a sp e c ts  o f in s ig h t  which a re  shared  
or ag reed  upon by alm ost any th e o ry , school or thought and p r a c t ic e .  
T herapeu tic  in s ig h t  i s  b a s ic a l ly  a le a rn in g  p ro cess  (a lth o u g h  th e re  
w i l l  be th o se  who claim  th a t  h is  i s  a s p e c ia l  s o r t  o f le a rn in g )  which 
d e a ls  w ith  v e ry  in d iv id u a l-e m o tio n a l sym bols. That be in g  th e  case , 
th e  p ro cess  i s  governed by some fundam ental le a rn in g  p r in c ip le s  which 
enab le  us to  u n d erstand  (perhaps n o t f u l ly )  how c e r ta in  p a t te rn s  o f 
b eh av io r a re  acq u ired  - though not c le a r ly  enough to  answer the  
q u es tio n  o f what has been a c q u ire d . Therapy can h e lp  n o t by prom oting 
u n d e rs tan d in g , b u t by making a v a ila b le  to  th e  c l i e n t  le a rn in g  experiences 
th a t  a re  as c o n c re te , as immediate, as com pelling as th e  le a rn in g  
ex periences th a t  i n i t i a l l y  brought about m aladaptive b e h av io r .
McGuire (49) p o in ts  out th a t  in s ig h t  i s  a by -p roduct of having 
le a rn ed  to  app ly  a method o f s e lf -u n d e rs ta n d in g . The main in s t r u c t io n  
goa l can be conceived  o f as te ac h in g  a method whereby th e  p a t ie n t  
le a rn s  to  reco g n ize , examine and p a r t i a l l y  understand  th e  in tra p sy c h ic  
causes as w e ll as th e  psych ic  and s o c ia l  consequences o f h is  c o n f l i c t s ,  
fe e l in g s  and th o u g h ts . One can conclude th a t  le a rn in g  th e se  s te p s  is  
u l t im a te ly  e q u iv a le n t to  le a rn in g  prob lem -so lv ing  m ethods. The problem 
i s  th e  c o n f l i c t  (and i t s  consequences) and th e  problem so lv in g  methods 
i t s  id e n t i f i c a t io n ,  namely in s ig h t .  Ludwig (46) remarks th a t  th e ra p e u tic  
in s ig h t  may o p e ra te  e i th e r  as a le a rn in g  or u n lea rn in g  p ro c e ss . I t  may 
be in te g ra t iv e  o r le a rn in g  ex p erien ce , whereby many d is p a ra te  th o u g h ts
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and emotions are unified into some meaningful framework and provide a 
new solution to previously unsolved problem. Or it may be unlearning 
experience whereby psychologic distortions are seen in a more proper 
and objective prospective - learning by unlearning through dynamic 
introspection. The patient can be expected to learn unconscious 
sources of his distress. Once these sources became explicit, he will 
have to employ problem solving or creative insight to solve the conflict. 
Both are necessary.
It can be assumed that therapy is a special learning situation 
which is designed to facilitate the therapeutic change by providing 
the atmosphere in which such new learning experiences can be promoted.
The importance of the unique relationship in therapy based upon the 
unconditional acceptance and warmth provided by the therapist, is 
another aspect which is well-recognized and agreed upon. "Psychotherapy 
is a situation carefully designed to make it possible for a client to 
learn to be close to another person without getting hurt." "In this 
special accepting situation where the ground rules are clear, the 
client dares to establish a fully honest relationship with another 
person, and finds it a tremendously reinforcing experience." (Hobbs, 31)
Truax (80) emphasizes the fundamental conditions put forward by 
Rogers, and notes that almost all theorists stress the importance of 
the therapist’s ability to: (l) sensitively and accurately understand
the patient and accurately and emphatically know the patient’s inner 
world and respond in such a manner as to communicate this deep under­
standing; (2) communicate a nonpossessive warmth and acceptance of the
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p a t ie n t ;  and (3) communicate h is  own genu ineness, a u th e n t ic i ty ,  or 
in te g ra t io n  w ith in  th e  th e ra p e u tic  en co u n te r. A ll th e  s tu d ie s  taken  
to g e th e r  c o n s t i tu te  s tro n g  evidence th a t  th e  le v e l  o f th e  t h e r a p i s t ’s 
a cc u ra te  empathy, nonpossessive warmth, and genuineness a re  r e la te d  
to  c o n s tru c tiv e  change in  th e  p a t i e n t .  One im p lic a tio n  of some s tu d ie s  
sug g ests  th a t  a s iz a b le  number of th e r a p is t s  a re  unable to  prov ide 
h igh  le v e ls  of empathy, warmth, and genuineness and a re  th e re fo re  
l ik e ly  to  prove p sy ch o th e rap eu tic  encoun ters  t h a t  change people  fo r  
th e  w orse.
The re se a rc h  review ed by Truax sug g ests  th a t  to  be f a c i l i t a t i v e  
tow ard an o th er human being  re q u ire s  us to  be deeply  s e n s i t iv e  to  th e  
moment-to-moment "being" to  th e  o th e r person  and to  g rasp  th e  meaning 
and s ig n if ic a n c e  as w e ll as th e  co n ten t o f h is  experiences and f e e l in g s .  
N e ith er of th e se  two f a c i l i t a t i v e  co n d itio n s  (warmth, empathy) could  
be c o n s tru c tiv e ly  m eaningful in  th e  th e ra p e u tic  encounter u n le ss  th ey  
a re  them selves " r e a l " .  Thus, u n le ss  th e  th e r a p is t  i s  genuine in  
r e la t in g  to  th e  p a t i e n t ,  warmth, c a rin g  and understand ing  would have 
no meaning, or even m ight have a p o te n t ia l ly  th re a te n in g  meaning.
I t  can be doubted w hether R ogers’ th re e  co n d itio n s  fo r  
th e ra p e u tic  e f f e c t s  (warmth, empathy, congruence) a re  s u f f i c i e n t ,  b u t 
i t  i s  w e ll e s ta b lis h e d  th a t  th e y  a re  n e ce ssa ry . Moreover, by p ro v id in g  
t h i s  s p e c ia l  le a rn in g  s i tu a t io n ,  th e  c l i e n t  i s  re in fo rc e d  (by means o f 
in te r p r e ta t io n ,  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f f e e l in g s )  to  examine an d /o r reexam ine, 
to  experience  an d /o r reex p e rien ce  h is  p a t te rn s  of b eh av io r, th o u g h t, 
f e e l in g s ,  m o tiv a tio n , e t c .  and g ra d u a lly  to  f e e l  f r e e  enough to  loosen
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up, to give up his rigidity, and adopt more flexible means to deal 
with himself and his environment.
In this context, Rogers (6l) remarks that there is a special 
change in figure-ground relationship which Duncker describes as the 
looseness versus the fixedness of a perceptual object. That is, both 
in problem solving and in therapy the person has come to accept a 
certain element of the situation as something given or fixed. When 
he reperceives this as something which is not fixed, he is apt to have 
a real "Aha" experience, and finds himself much nearer to a solution 
of his problem. This change from perceiving elements as rigid and 
fixed, to perceiving them as "loose" or changeable is one of the most 
important types of differentiation which occur in therapy.
This process of looseness versus fixedness, or rigidity versus 
flexibility, seems to be the most fundamental condition to any outcome 
of therapy. Only after reaching this stage can the process of re­
integration of feelings and knowledge (or understanding), the process 
of combination, take place. This, to my mind, is the process of 
insight.
The question of flexibility represents for psychology one of its 
typical problems: significant enough to be attacked over and over
again, sufficiently complex not to be easily resolved. Almost 
synonymously to flexibility one can find the following "spontaneous 
flexibility," "adaptive flexibility," "adaptability," "preservation," 
"mental set," "shifts of thought." The diverse notions and definitions 
have an historical value. The use of different formulations may be 
explained in part by differences in conceptual framework and changing 
fashions in scientific terminology.
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A revival of extensive research on "flexible thinking" can be 
noted in Guilford's oeuvre, as one of the scales measuring creativity. 
Others dealing with cognitive processes (e.g. Brunner) use terms such 
as "concept formation" or "sorting tasks". Following are some 
descriptions of rigidity versus flexibility, as defined by some of 
the writers on the subject:
"Rigidity . . .  means stiffness, i.e. a resistance to forces 
attempting to produce change" (Cattel).
"Spontaneous flexibility represents an ability or disposition 
of freedom from inertia in thinking, making possible the production 
of a diversity of ideas. Adaptive flexibility emphasizes restructuring 
of interpretation and approaches in problem-solving and elsewhere" 
(Guilford)•
"Flexible thinking is the ability to consider alternative means 
to a given end" (Busse).
"The state of flexibility is where new experiences can occur 
and be appreciated . . .  openness to experience" (Rogers).
"Rigidity is not a simple concept and the sub-divisions within 
it are far from being clear" (Chown)•
It seems that it does not really matter which theory of learning 
one adopts, or what terminology one uses: It is clear that by their
very nature the processes of adaptation, growth in cognitive realms, 
and learning involve organizing and categorizing the environment 
(Brunner). Many experimental results show a distinct "flexible" or 
"non-flexible" behavior as a result of the learning process. It can 
be said that flexible behavior can be described as a shifting from
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one conceptual scheme, category or hypothesis to another. After 
reaching this stage of "shifting from one conceptual scheme to another," 
which in therapy can be translated as loosening up defenses, the 
process of discovery of new relationships between given knowledge, 
facts, emotions, etc., that is, the process of reorganization, can 
take place, and this is essentially the process of insight. Guilford, 
among his other hypotheses concerning creativity, speaks of the 
"individual flexibility of mind." Factor analysis performed by him 
later on postulated flexibility as being one aspect of creativity.
Here too is a similarity between the concept of creativity and that of 
insight. Both processes are characterized as being basically processes 
of combination, of binding, forming and creating new relationships 
between given aspects of knowledge and feelings, and of rearranging 
them into new unique individual sequences and whole. The new, resultant, 
combination appears to the beholder in the form of a discovery. It is 
a new entity, which - as previously explained - is more than the sum 
of its components. This is why insight is often described as an 
illumination, sometimes followed by a feeling of revelation. Therapeutic 
and creative insight (comparable to the Eureka experience) represent 
stages in man's discovery and growing awareness of his whole self.
"This insight never occurs slowly but always suddenly, during relaxation 
and wide diffusion of consciousness" (Martin and Alexander, 47). 
Insightful activity, just like creativity, is an attempt to provide 
parsimonious organized solutions to particular problems. Only when 
the client is free enough to learn to feel what he says (shift from a
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state of rigidity to a state of flexibility) and develops an 
emotional conviction in the truth of his verbal productions, does 
he experience therapeutic insight.
Stirlin (77) emphasizes the "creative dialectic" between 
conscious and unconscious. He asks: what makes insight true insight? 
And that, in turn, means: How is the gaining of insight tied to the 
gaining of new life experience? This question has many angles. In 
order that insight may not "become wasted and stereotyped, there must 
exist a kind of "creative dialect" between a person’s conscious thinking 
and his largely unconscious affective life.
Many research projects carried out by Guilford and his followers 
deal with the proposition that creativity - like intelligence - can be 
described as an innate ability. They say that vast individual 
differences can be found as far as the capability is concerned. More­
over they claim that creative thinking can be cultivated, at least to 
some extent. Though they have not yet found sufficient scientific 
proof for their theory, their assumptions seem logical. If their line 
of thinking is followed can one assume that insight has the same 
foundations? This question will have to remain unanswered. At this 
stage it is mere unfounded speculation. Intensive research has to be 
done before one can even try attacking this problem.
Though the problem of differentiation between intellectual and 
emotional insight has already been dealt with in Chapter I, it is 
important to stress that insight is an individual phenomenon, and its 
usefulness depends upon its wholeness. The differences between the
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two aspects of insight derive from disappointments from therapeutic 
results. Thus, Singer (72) says that in Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory, and in learning theory, the term insight describes a process 
of perceiving and understanding connections in an essentially 
intellectualized fashion. In psychoanalytic therapy it refers to a 
rational appreciation of one’s behavior and its motivational main­
springs. Many psychoanalysts maintain that such an understanding has 
significant effects in bringing about modification of behavior.
Disappointing results in psychotherapeutic efforts, which were 
based on such premises, led to a search for new conceptualizations of 
insight and to the insistence that insight should be defined as an 
experiential process. Some authors proposed that only emotional 
insight and full awareness of personal experience could lead to any 
genuine change and modification of behavior.
A careful examination of the conditions necessary for the break­
through of experience into consciousness leads to the reduction of 
the dichotomy between intellectual and emotional insight. Such a 
reconciliation rests on the recognition that the personal qualities 
necessary for true intellectual insight and emotional insight are 
identical.
It seems that quite often "intellectual insight" and "intellectuali- 
zation" are used interchangeably. Intellectualization, but its nature, 
is a defense mechanism, and functions as a barrier against the revealing 
of any real understanding (emotional or intellectual). Any real insight 
is mainly a cognitive process based on acquiring and absorption of an 
understanding (emotional and intellectual). Cognition should be 
perceived as a multi-level, multi-functional entity, the framework of
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which encompasses many processes including an emotional one.
Through the process of therapy the individual encounters a 
special atmosphere and relationship that enable him to make use of 
the learning experiences provided to him. These learning experiences 
reinforce and help him in widening his cognition; creating new 
sequences, relationships and reorganization between past and present 
patterns, feelings and motivations, of which he was not previously 
aware; and assimilating them into the cognition and carrying them 
on to life situations.
As to the question of what and how or why in insight: the what
can be answered in accordance with the general personality theory that 
each of us adopts. The how and why can be answered by investigating 
the two facets of insight - the problem-solving process, and the process 
of combination.
Much remains unclear. Intensive research is still needed in 
the field of problem-solving on the one hand, and in the field of 
creativity on the other. The knowledge we shall gain from understanding 
both processes will enable us to grasp more clearly the process of 
insight as an effective therapeutic agent. Insight is, by no means, 
the only or exclusive means of bringing about therapeutic change 
(conditioning techniques, even life situations can provide very 
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